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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the question of how the people of Upper Louisiana lived under 
Spanish imperial authority from 1766 to 1780, and how they reacted to the transition from 
French to Spanish governance. More specifically, this thesis looks at the direct interactions 
that inhabitants had with the Spanish colonial officials in St. Louis and New Orleans. To 
further understand these imperial relationships, it looks at how the French inhabitants 
from different colonies (Upper Louisiana, Lower Louisiana, and the Illinois Country) 
interacted with each other, as a way of understanding Spanish authority and its limits. This 
thesis is interested in the French inhabitants’ relationship with the Spanish state. It 
provides insight into the nature of governance and imperial relationships and examines 
how colonial peoples accepted and contested imperial regime change. It contends that the 
French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana went through periods of resistance, infiltration, and 
rapprochement with the Spanish colonial government. 
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Map from the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University.1 
                                                          
1 Thomas Hutchins, “A Plan of the several Villages in the Illinois Country, with Part of the River Mississippi &c.,” A 
topographical description of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina, comprehending the rivers Ohio 
Kenhawa, Sioto, Cherokee, Wabash, Illinois, Mississippi. (London: J. Almon, 1778), 40-41.      
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Introduction 
On August 19, 1769, Spanish general Alejandro O’Reilly invited eleven leading 
French residents of New Orleans to dine at his residence. The Frenchmen had planned and 
executed the ousting of Spanish Governor Ulloa in October 1768.2 O’Reilly had retaken the 
city a month earlier at the head of 2,000 Spanish soldiers. Weeks without repercussions 
had the French conspirators on edge, but they hoped that this meeting was a chance to 
come to an understanding with the Spanish general. O’Reilly had other plans. Upon their 
arrival, the French leaders were all arrested and charged with treason against the Spanish 
Crown. Joseph Petit was sentenced to life in prison, Julien Doucet and Balthasar de Mason 
received ten years each, and Pierre Poupet and Jean Milhet received six years. Joseph 
Milhet, Nicolas Chauvin de Lafrenière, Pierre Caresse, Pierre Marquis, and Jean Baptiste de 
Noyan were all sentenced to death, and Joseph Villeré was killed while resisting arrest. 
Those given prison sentences were shipped to Havana, the other five were executed by 
firing squad in October 1769, and the rest of the local population received a general 
pardon. Imperial Spain had returned to Louisiana.3  
The bloodless uprising in New Orleans in 1768 originated from French inhabitants’ 
resistance to imperious policies governing trade with other colonies, and the Spanish 
officials’ lack of knowledge concerning local customs and conventions. Spain responded in 
force and crushed the initial fervour for the ousting of the Spanish Governor. O’Reilly only 
punished the immediate leaders of the rebellion, and then set out to improve relations with 
                                                          
2 Carl Brasseaux, Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768. (Ruston, LA: McGinty Publications, 
1987), 43; Brasseaux, “Confusion, Conflict, and Currency: An introduction to the Rebellion of 1768.” Louisiana 
History 18, no. 2 (Spring 1977): 164. 
3 Ibid. 
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local French leaders throughout Louisiana.4 While the French inhabitants of Upper 
Louisiana did not participate in the rebellion, the initial arrival of the Spanish in Louisiana, 
the rebellion in the south, and the subsequent changes to how Spain governed the region 
afterwards set the stage for how interactions between the French people and Spanish 
officials would proceed. French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana and St. Louis responded to 
Spanish rule by resisting Spanish authority upon their arrival, infiltrating the Spanish 
administration following the rebellion, and finally working towards a rapprochement with 
Spanish colonial officials in the face of external threats. 
This thesis addresses the question of how the people of Upper Louisiana lived under 
Spanish imperial authority from 1766 to 1780, and how they reacted to the transition from 
French to Spanish governance. More specifically, this thesis looks at the direct interactions 
that inhabitants had with the Spanish colonial officials in St. Louis and New Orleans. To 
further understand these imperial relationships, it looks at how the French inhabitants 
from different colonies (Upper Louisiana, Lower Louisiana, and the Illinois Country) 
interacted with each other, as a way of understanding Spanish authority and its limits. This 
thesis is interested in the French inhabitants’ relationship with the Spanish state.5 It 
provides insight into the nature of governance and imperial relationships and examines 
how colonial peoples accepted and contested imperial regime change. This analysis helps 
to understand the limits of imperial authority on the imperial frontier. The three chapters 
                                                          
4 Carl J. Ekberg and Sharon K. Person, St. Louis Rising: The French Regime of Louis St. Ange de Bellerive, (Urbana: 
University of Illinois press, 2015), 73; Patricia Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. 
Louis, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011), 80. 
5 This thesis does not look at the Spanish government’s perspective due to the author’s inability to read Spanish 
sources. 
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are arranged chronologically and comparatively to understand the different responses of 
the French inhabitants to the evolving policies of the Spanish regime.  
Chapter one examines how the late 1760s represented an initial clash of different 
visions of government between Imperial Spain and the French inhabitants of Upper 
Louisiana. The French inhabitants wished to be left at an arms-length from colonial 
oversight, and resisted the Spanish officials’ hands-on, yet economically frugal approach to 
governing the colony.6 French inhabitants and the Spanish officials clashed over trade 
policies, Indigenous relations, religious practices, and the prospect of British expansion 
west of the Mississippi. The chapter examines the French inhabitants’ use of petitions to 
resist the changes that the Spanish were trying to implement. This chapter also examines 
how the French inhabitants protested Spanish officials’ lack of awareness concerning local 
customs, and as well the incompetence of the first Spanish commander in Upper Louisiana, 
Francisco Ríu. 
 Chapter two examines the aftermath of the Louisiana Rebellion of 1768, and how it 
affected the French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana. The Spanish response to rebellion 
allowed the French inhabitants to move away from openly resisting the Spanish regime, 
and instead took the opportunity to infiltrate the colonial government structure. The 
French inhabitants of St. Louis, a town founded in 1764 by French merchants from New 
Orleans, maintained a respect for the rule of Spanish law, but they did not see the early 
                                                          
6 Shannon Lee Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008), 228; James Pritchard, In Search of Empire, (University of Cambridge Press, 2007), 231; Fred Fausz, 
Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, (Charleston: The History Press, 2011), 68; Patricia Cleary, The World, 
the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 31; William E. Foley, A History of Missouri, 1763 to 1820 Vol 
1. (University of Missouri, 1989), 29; Jay Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 
17. 
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Spanish commanders of the region to be legitimate community leaders. Instead, they 
continued to look to Louis Groston de Saint-Ange de Bellerive, the former French 
Commandant of the Illinois Country and Upper Louisiana, and François Vallé, the Captain of 
the militia in Ste. Genevieve for leadership. St. Ange was seen as the highest level of local 
authority in the eyes of the French people. The French inhabitants continued to bring their 
grievances to St. Ange, rather than to the Spanish leaders. Governor Alexander O’Reilly, the 
Spanish commander, charged with retaking Louisiana after the rebellion, recognized the 
need for local French expertise. He recruited various French persons into official 
government positions, and these French leaders in turn used their influence to help guide 
local policies to the French inhabitants’ benefit. 
Finally, chapter three looks at how the French inhabitants of St. Louis came to a 
rapprochement with colonial Spanish officials. While French inhabitants no longer played 
major roles in the government structure of Upper Louisiana after the passing of St. Ange in 
1774, local Spanish officials maintained French traditions and laws. As the tensions 
between the two sides began to ease, an increase in economic activity and growth gripped 
the region. This economic boom saw tensions shift to internal trade and property disputes 
between French inhabitants. In these disputes, the French inhabitants accepted the Spanish 
Lieutenant-Governor as adjudicator of local custom and law. The lack of conflict eventually 
fostered outright cooperation, which manifested in the face of a British attack on St. Louis 
in 1780. 
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History of Louisiana 
Louisiana was established as a colony in the early eighteenth century as an 
experimental French colony, in which the imperial French bureaucrats in Paris wished to 
improve upon the problems that had arisen in the older French colonies. Taking an almost 
utopian view, they hoped that Louisiana would not only build upon the experience of 
existing colonies, but that it could be a newer, better France. French ministers hoped the 
colony could eliminate the flaws which they saw as inherent to the social order and 
economic system in France.7 Through the forced emigration of vagabonds and criminals to 
the new colony, French ministers saw this as an opportunity to help lessen the social 
burden at home, while also providing these unwanted individuals with a chance for a fresh 
start and personal reform.8 The initial imperial optimism towards Louisiana’s colonial 
potential was evidenced by the large initial investments, none more infamous than John 
Law’s Company of the Indies. Through public and private investment, he hoped to 
jumpstart the economic potential of the colony. Things quickly went badly, however, when 
the greatly exaggerated wealth of the colony was reported back in France, which quickly 
led to wild speculation and the creation of the Mississippi economic bubble. The central 
French bank did not have the currency to cover all the notes being issued, and an 
unexpected cash-in by large numbers of investors led to the bubble bursting. Metropolitan 
                                                          
7 The French ministers banned seigneurial titles and land practices in Louisiana in the hopes of limiting growth of 
the noble class. Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans, 67; Marcel Giraud, Histoire de La 
Louisiane Française vol. IV. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953), 234; Francois Barbe-Marbois, The 
History of Louisiana, Edited by E Lyon, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press: 1977), 110; Charles Gayarré, History of 
Louisiana, vol 4, (New York: 1972), 204; Pierre Heinrich, La Louisiane sous la Compagnie des Indes, 1717-1731, 
(New York: 1970), 47; Pritchard, In Search of Empire, xxi. 
8 Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans, 228; Pritchard, In Search of Empire, 231; Pierre 
Heinrich, La Louisiane sous la Compagnie des Indes, 1717-1731, 49. 
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France quickly lost interest in the prospects of the new colony.9 This initial failed colonial 
experiment set the stage for how Louisiana would become a colony left to its own designs.  
The government of France largely forgot about Louisiana and thus local inhabitants largely 
managed the colony based on their own self-interests. 
Upper and Lower Louisiana, and the Illinois Country (the territory across the 
Mississippi River from Upper Louisiana) were all linked by trade and familial connections. 
Pierre Laclède, a French merchant, and his creole stepson Auguste Chouteau from New 
Orleans, founded St. Louis in Upper Louisiana in 1764. Much of the early population of St. 
Louis came from the Illinois Country on the eastern side of the Mississippi, which had 
recently become British territory under the Treaty of Paris of 1763.10 Since the founding of 
New Orleans in 1718, regular trade and social relationships had developed between the 
crescent city and the Illinois Country. A secondary, but necessary focus of this study is the 
relationships between the French inhabitants of New Orleans in Lower Louisiana, St. Louis 
in Upper Louisiana, and French speaking inhabitants of British, and later American, Illinois 
Country.  Understanding the interrelationship of French-speaking peoples and regions 
helps elucidate how the French people reacted to and lived under the Spanish regime on 
the frontier.  
While the Louisiana Rebellion of 1768 will not be the central focus of the thesis, the 
rebellion in New Orleans and Louis Groston de St. Ange de Bellerive’s return as the 
                                                          
9 Ibid. 
10 Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans, 228; Pritchard, In Search of Empire, 231; Fausz, 
Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, 68; Patricia Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of 
Colonial St. Louis, 31; Foley, A History of Missouri, 1763 to 1820 Vol 1, 29; Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 17. 
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commander of St. Louis are important episodes for understanding how French people 
reacted to the Spanish takeover in Upper Louisiana. Following the end of the Rebellion of 
1768 and Pedro Piernas’s return to St. Louis in 1770, Spanish leaders governed in St. Louis 
and New Orleans until 1793.11 Due to this uninterrupted period of Spanish rulers in St. 
Louis and New Orleans, the rebellion in New Orleans and St. Ange’s tenure (1768-70) as a 
Spanish Lieutenant Governor provides unique opportunities for studying the relationship 
between French People and the Spanish State.  
Background to the Rebellion of 1768 
The Treaty of Paris brought an end to the Seven Years’ War in 1763, marking the 
end of the French Empire in mainland North America. Only the Islands of St. Pierre and 
Miquelon in the North and the islands of the French Antilles remained of the once vast 
French North-American Empire. Quebec and all the land east of the Mississippi River, 
except New Orleans, came under British imperial control. In anticipation of this loss, France 
ceded Louisiana Territory west of the Mississippi and New Orleans to Bourbon Spain 
through the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762. France, however, neglected to 
immediately inform its former subjects in Louisiana. The details of the treaty were not 
confirmed until 1766 when the Spanish began to exert control over its new possession.12 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, 68; Patricia Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A 
History of Colonial St. Louis, 31; Foley, A History of Missouri, 1763 to 1820 Vol 1., 29; Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 
18. 
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The secret nature of the transition created a tense relationship between the new 
Spanish State and the people of Louisiana. The Spanish Governor, Antonio de Ulloa, was 
greeted in New Orleans with discontentment. Eventually members of the former French 
administration, with support from merchants and commoners threatened violence. They 
were upset over enforcement of restrictive Spanish trade policies.13 Spanish trade policies 
reduced economic opportunities for French merchants by limiting trade exclusively to 
other Spanish colonies. Consequently, inter-colonial trade, which had been the economic 
lifeblood of the region, was now officially forbidden.14  
In the fall of 1768, French conspirators, led by Denis-Nicolas Foucault, the 
Commissary for Louisiana under France, and Nicolas Chauvin de Lafrenière, began plotting 
against Ulloa. They hatched a plan to force the Spanish Governor out and take control of 
Louisiana. They hoped that France would come to the aid of the abandoned colony.15 The 
conspirators gathered support from the surrounding communities, including the colonists 
from the nearby German Coast, and marched on New Orleans. The rebels overtook the 
city's armoury, confronted Ulloa, and gave the Governor three days to leave. Governor Ulloa 
complied and was forced to retreat to Cuba in November of 1768.16 The Spanish Crown did 
not back down in the face of resistance in Louisiana. In response, the Spanish sent a two 
thousand-man force under the command of Alejandro O’Reilly, an Irish-born military 
                                                          
13 Reinhart Kondert, “Germans of Louisiana.” Journal of Southern History 72, (2006): 172. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Brasseaux, Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768, 43. 
16 Brasseaux, “Confusion, Conflict, and Currency: An introduction to the Rebellion of 1768.” 164. 
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reformer and Captain General for the Spanish Empire. O'Reilly's forces overwhelmed the 
rebels and restored Spanish control of Louisiana.  
As trouble was brewing in the south, the new Spanish Lieutenant-Governor of 
Louisiana, stationed in St. Louis, faced growing resentment and insubordination in the 
north. Pedro Piernas was assigned to take control of the region from Louis Groston de St. 
Ange de Bellerive, the former French commander of the Illinois Country and Upper 
Louisiana. No sooner had Piernas begun to take control of the region when word from Ulloa 
arrived with orders to vacate his post, and return south due to the rebellion in New 
Orleans.17 Piernas handed control of Upper Louisiana back to St. Ange. This transfer 
created an interesting dynamic in which a former French commander was acting under 
Spanish authority. Back in command, St. Ange could ease the tensions that the people had 
over their new government. With the end of the rebellion in the south and the return of 
Piernas to St. Louis in 1770, St. Ange gave back control of Upper Louisiana to the Spanish. 
Piernas’s return ushered in a period of four consecutive Lieutenant-Governors of Spanish 
descent.18 
Historiography 
This research is situated at the important intersection of three different 
geographically defined literatures: the history of New Orleans and Lower Louisiana; the 
history of Upper Louisiana and St. Louis; the history of the Illinois Country.  Louisiana 
encompassed the area between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains, rising 
                                                          
17 Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 103. 
18 In 1793, Zénon Trudeau, a native Frenchman, was appointed as the Spanish Lieutenant Governor of Upper 
Louisiana. 
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north from New Orleans to slightly past the 49th parallel north. Upper and Lower Louisiana 
were divided by the Arkansas River. The Illinois Country encompassed the lands east of the 
Mississippi claimed by France south of the Great Lakes and north of the mouth of the Ohio 
River. Most scholarship treats these regions as separate areas of study. This thesis, 
however, focuses on the relationships that existed between the people in these regions, 
thereby connecting them.19 Examining the connections between French people of the 
regions shows how these relationships influenced and affected interactions between 
French people of Upper Louisiana and Spanish colonial officials who represented Spanish 
imperial authority. 
Literature on the Illinois Country has centered on official state histories, 
international diplomacy, or has been concerned with fitting into the American grand 
narrative of expansion from east to west. Clarence Walworth Alvord’s The Illinois Country 
1763-1818, provides a grand narrative history of the State of Illinois. He was tasked with 
providing insight into how the State of Illinois fits into the history of the United States.20 
Alvord was mostly interested in the diplomatic and political implications of British and 
American occupation of the Illinois Country. Alvord’s research looked at the early dealings 
of French inhabitants, but when the British and Americans arrived he took a whiggish 
approach, which favoured ideas of American westward expansion.  
                                                          
19 Englebert “Merchant Representatives and the French River World, 1763-1803.” Michigan Historical Review 34, 
no.1 (2008): 63-82; Carl J. Ekberg, Colonial St. Genevieve: An Adventure on the Mississippi Frontier. (The Patrice 
Press, 1996), 56; Ekberg, French Roots in the Illinois, (University of Illinois Press, 2000), 23; Gitlin. The Bourgeois 
Frontier, 17. 
20 Clarence Walworth Alvord. The Illinois Country 1763-1818. (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1965), 240. 
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John Francis Bannon shifted his focus away from the American grand narrative and 
turned his attention to Spain, but continued with the same type of focus as Alvord on 
diplomatic and political history. Bannon explained Spanish governance of Louisiana in 
relations to Spain’s broader international imperial struggle against Great Britain. He 
outlined the rivalries that erupted between the two empires as incoming British and 
American settlers entered the Illinois Country, and as the Spanish took possession of 
Louisiana.21  
In the study of Upper Louisiana, the American grand narrative was picked up again 
by contemporary scholars, such as Jay Gitlin, while other authors such as Fred Fausz and 
Patricia Cleary focused on the everyday life and economic activity of St. Louis. Gitlin 
provides a narrative that highlights the role of French merchants in the westward 
expansion of the United States. Gitlin argues that French merchants were not bystanders in 
American expansion, but rather acted as 'middle men', using their relationships with 
Indigenous groups to negotiate terms for the American advance.22 Fausz's book, Founding 
St. Louis: First City of the New West, argues that St. Louis became an Indigenous-French 
utopia in which French colonial culture was preserved and expanded after Imperial France 
had left the continent.23 Patricia Cleary looks at the diplomatic history of St. Louis, from a 
localized view. She argues that "St. Louis served as a reminder of the limits to [Spain’s] 
imperial reach and coffers, with inadequate supplies, poor facilities, and an understaffed 
                                                          
21 John Francis Bannon. “The Spaniards and the Illinois Country, 1762-1800.” Journal of the Illinois State Historical 
Society, 69, no.2 (May 1976): 115. 
22 Gitlin, Jay. The Bourgeois Frontier, 12. 
23 Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, 20. 
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garrison all exposing the inability of administrators to fulfill the diplomatic and defensive 
responsibilities of the post."24  
Cleary and Fausz’s histories of St. Louis contradict each other on how the people of 
St. Louis viewed and interacted with the Spanish government. Cleary argues that the 
Spanish Government in St. Louis was in a constant state of paranoia over threat of rebellion 
from the French inhabitants and attacks from Indigenous peoples. Fausz argues the 
opposite; St. Louis was an open city where the French, Spanish, and Indigenous peoples all 
lived in harmony. This thesis differs from both Cleary and Fausz in that it argues that the 
agency of French inhabitants and merchants meant that they sought to carve out their own 
political and social space, one that was neither characterized by paranoia nor by some 
idyllic utopic vision of Euro-Indigenous harmony.  
Carl J. Ekberg and Sharon K. Person provide a different perspective on the early 
years of St. Louis. Ekberg looks at the early period of St. Louis’s history through Louis St. 
Ange de Bellerive, the former French Commandant of the Illinois country, rather than the 
more common approach, which looks at the founders of St. Louis, Pierre Laclède or Auguste 
Chouteau. This thesis builds on that work by looking at the importance of community 
leaders seen in St. Ange and Francois Vallé, and the continuation of French culture under 
the Spanish. Ekberg’s book only looks at the very earliest period of St. Louis, and does not 
continue after 1775. This study continues after St. Ange’s imposing presence had 
disappeared, and importantly, as the French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana began to work 
                                                          
24 Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 300. 
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more closely with the Imperial Spanish officials, and began to accept the Spanish as 
administrators.  
Economic interests and administrative corruption are the main characteristics of 
historiography concerning Lower Louisiana. Beginning with the seminal work, Histoire de 
La Louisiane Française vol. V, Marcel Giraud argued that Louisiana’s French colonial 
government was plagued by managerial abuses and power struggles, which created 
divisions of loyalty amongst officers and settlers.25 Carl Brasseaux continues in the same 
vein, looking directly at the political situation before and during the rebellion of 1768. He 
argues that fiscal instability, official rivalries, and isolation helped lead to rebellion. French 
administrators picked sides in the interest of political and personal advancement.26 
Brasseaux’s ideas are an example of how different pre-existing economic and political 
rivalries between French people in Louisiana affected the ways in which they individually 
responded to the new Spanish government.  
The other major trend in the historiography of Lower Louisiana concerns the 
economic interests and potential turmoil that the new Spanish regime brought through 
restrictive trade policies. The study of the regional economic interests has been especially 
concerned with groups of settlers from different ethnic backgrounds in Lower Louisiana. 
Brasseaux traces the involvement of Acadian setters in The Founding of New Acadia: The 
Beginnings of Acadian Life in Louisiana, 1765-1803, while Reinhart Kondert documented the 
                                                          
25 Marcel Giraud, Histoire de La Louisiane Française vol. V. (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1953), 114. 
26 Brasseaux, Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768. 43. 
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involvement of colonists from the area West of New Orleans, known as the German Coast. 
Kondert argued that it was not the direct actions of the Spanish Governor against the 
German settlers that caused them to join the revolt, but rather Spain’s general policy of 
restricting colonial trade with France and Great Britain. Trade outside of Spain's colonial 
sphere was the lifeblood of the German Coast economy.27  
Alfred Hero’s work has also contributed to the study of Lower Louisiana. Through a 
comparison of the French settlers’ reactions to the end of the Seven Years' War in Louisiana 
and Quebec, Hero studied how the French populations respectively dealt with the burden 
of new colonial regimes. Hero argues that the departure of imperial France cut the link 
between Quebec and Louisiana. The first-hand violence of the Seven Years’ War tempered 
the population in Quebec, while the relatively untouched Louisiana region remained 
isolated, and the removal of French authority came as an unexpected shock.28 These works 
provide different examples of how French people in Louisiana reacted to the change in 
imperial authority, and provide insight into how the individual factors of their new 
relationship with the state guided their reactions. 
Frontiers and Borderlands 
The historiography of colonialism, especially centered on theory of how colonized 
people reacted to foreign imperial powers plays an important role in what questions I 
                                                          
27 Kondert, “Germans of Louisiana,” 173. 
28 Alfred Hero, Louisiana and Quebec: bilateral relations and comparative sociopolitical evolution, 1673-1993. 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), 126. 
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asked of my sources. The works of Frederick Cooper, James C. Scott, Christine Daniels and 
Michael V. Kennedy all provide insight into the theoretical approaches that have been used 
to analyse colonial populations.29 Frederick Cooper focuses on the theoretical debate about 
the West’s impact on the rest of the world. Cooper’s work suggests that scholarship on 
colonialism has suffered from a lack of originality, largely because of the influence of 
critical theory.30 Critical theory sees the Enlightenment as an all-encompassing project that 
forced colonial peoples to submit to its own standards of reason and progress.31 Cooper 
contends that this fails to appreciate the ways that colonial peoples turned such notions to 
their own purposes for challenging imperial power. Cooper’s effort is to avoid euro-centric 
models, and focus on doing history that empowers people to work against injustice and 
inequality, and considers the ways in which both the colonizers and colonized influenced 
each other. As this thesis discusses a population of European origin, aspects of a euro-
centric model cannot be avoided. What one can take away from Cooper, however, is to 
examine history from the perspective of colonized people, rather than relying on the 
colonizer’s generalized observations about the people they governed.  
James C. Scott challenges the idea that modern civilization will inevitably lead to 
state-hood. Through a study of the Zomia peoples of the highlands of Southeast Asia, Scott 
                                                          
29 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010); Frederick Cooper. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 4; Christine Daniels, and Michael V. Kennedy. Negotiated Empires: Centers 
and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500–1820. (Routledge, 2013). 
30 Critical theory is a philosophical approach to culture and literature that seeks to confront the social, historical, 
and ideological forces and structure that produce and constrain it. Max Horkheimer. Critical Theory. (New York: 
Continuum Publishers, 1982), 244. 
31 Cooper. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. 2005, 4. 
16 
 
contends that they remain stateless by choice. The Zomia peoples have not ‘missed’ 
modern civilization, but rather actively avoided it.32 Scott’s work helps to understand the 
ways in which colonized people sought to avoid the imperial system, and their motivations 
and methods of doing so. Scott’s work informs questions regarding why colonized peoples 
decided to accept imperial systems of power and governance. It also challenges notions of 
progress and modern civilization, important factors in how imperial powers interacted 
with their colonies. 
 Negotiated Empires: Centres and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820 is an 
anthology, which focuses on the interdependence of colonial centers and peripheries, and 
power negotiations in early modern empires. Leslie Choquette’s piece on French North 
America shows that French settlers in North America and the Caribbean defended their 
own interests despite their king's notion of absolute power. Choquette treated French 
colonies as both a centre and a periphery, which is particularly useful for this study. St. 
Louis was for European imperial empires at the periphery, but it represented an important 
regional centre for colonists and fur trading activities. The need for the French colonists to 
interact and negotiate with Indigenous peoples is shown as example of center 
encompassing the periphery and vice versa.33 Choquette’s piece helps to understand the 
complex relationship that existed between the French crown and its colonies, including to 
what extent the colonies resented or relied on interference by the crown.  
                                                          
32 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. 63. 
33 Leslie Choquette, “Center and Periphery in French North America” in Negotiated Empires: Centers and 
Peripheries in the Americas, 1500–1820. Edited by Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy. (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 194. 
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Kathleen DuVal’s The Native Ground, helps to explain the greater reliance of the 
French inhabitants on the Indigenous peoples in Upper Louisiana than in Canada. Her 
refutation of Richard White’s middle ground theory argues that in the heart of North 
America, Indigenous peoples shaped the region’s economics and politics far more than the 
Spanish, French, and British. The native ground theory explores how Indigenous people 
along the Arkansas River drew European empires into local patterns of land and resource 
allocation, sustenance, goods exchange, gender relations, diplomacy, and warfare.  DuVal 
argues that European settlers adapted to the region’s Indigenous peoples, countering the 
idea of both sides coming together and creating new forms of interaction as documented by 
White in the Great Lakes region.34  
The Indigenous peoples in Louisiana maintained demographic superiority as 
compared to the sparsely populated European outposts and villages in the region. The 
French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana relied on the local Indigenous groups for economic 
survival from trading, and for physical protection from other unfriendly Indigenous groups. 
The local Indigenous groups, such as the Osage maintained the upper hand in negotiations 
with the French settlers, and frequently used this power dynamic imbalance to their 
advantage.35 
 
 
                                                          
34 Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent, (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 32. 
35 Ibid; Gilbert Din and Abraham P. Nasatir, The imperial Osages: Spanish-Indian diplomacy in the Mississippi Valley, 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), 362. 
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Sources and Methods 
This thesis examines sources from both published primary source collections and 
archival manuscript documents. The Chouteau Collection in the Papers of the St. Louis Fur 
Trade, available on microfilm through the University of Saskatchewan’s Murray Library, is a 
record of the business life of the Chouteau family, its financial partners, and its business 
associates. The Chouteau collection also serves as a social record for the city of St. Louis 
and the smaller communities where the Chouteau family lived and traded. Additional 
materials from the Missouri History Museum in St. Louis, Missouri were also used. 
Collections, such as the St. Louis Archives, 1766-1804, the St. Louis History Collection, the 
Litigation Collection, and the Governors Collection, were instrumental in this study. The 
Litigation Collection provides the basis for chapter three, through court documents. These 
documents show how the French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana interacted with the 
Spanish led courts to resolve disputes.  
Personal records from the St. Louis History collection, such as correspondence, 
provide commentary on how French people viewed the government, and as well insight 
into how social interactions with other French people affected their individual dealings 
with the state. Economic activity through merchants and creditors provides insight into 
how business people interact and what types of goods people are buying, as well as the 
taxes being imposed on them. These sources speak to how the Spanish laws were being 
followed and enforced. Estate inventories are a demonstration of how wealth was inherited 
through families and shows connections to other regions. Legal records demonstrate how 
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disputes were resolved. When researching the larger collections, a list of core individuals 
who were more prominently mentioned was formed, as they have more documentation of 
their activities. Using this list was useful to navigate the collections and begin to 
understand how the relationships between French people functioned during this period.  
Other material used from the Missouri History Museum included the Price 
Compilation, a group of selected translations from the Papeles Procedentes de Cuba. The 
Papeles Procedentes de Cuba is a collection of official Spanish colonial documents, of which 
the original documents are held at the Archivo General de Indias in Seville, Spain.36 The 
Papeles Procedentes de Cuba is a collection of documents that form part of the Spanish 
colonial bureaucracy, such as correspondence between Governors and the Crown, military 
personnel, censuses, and include treasury records. Most of the papers were written in 
Spanish; however, twenty-five percent of the documents are in French, which made them 
useful sources for understanding the French inhabitants’ perspectives. As well, the ability 
to pair the original French documents with the translated Spanish documents of the Price 
Compilation helps to provide coverage of material from all sources. To study the 
interactions between the French inhabitants and the Spanish state this study looked for 
official decrees or laws issued by the governments. Specific correspondence between the 
Spanish governments in St. Louis and New Orleans with French inhabitants was also of 
importance.  
                                                          
36 Microfilm copies are located at the Missouri History Museum in St. Louis, Missouri. 
20 
 
Conclusion 
The French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana resisted, infiltrated and ultimately 
cooperated with the new Spanish officials to protect their culture, customs, and economic 
interests. Recognizing the shift in international diplomacy happening around them, the 
French inhabitants successfully carved out a niche within the Spanish system being forced 
on them. Due to the remote nature of the Upper Louisiana frontier from the metropole, and 
even New Orleans, the Spanish officials had no choice but to allow the French inhabitants to 
negotiate this space on their terms. This thesis highlights the importance of French joint-
ideals and local customs, the importance of local institutions, and the community leaders 
they looked to for guidance. This thesis demonstrates that not only were the French 
inhabitants of Upper Louisiana able to maintain their cultural and economic standing in the 
face of a new regime, but that they displayed remarkable agency to negotiate and improve 
their political futures from 1766 to 1780. 
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Chapter 1: Spanish Incompetence and French Resistance 
The conclusion of the Seven Years’ War had destroyed the dream of a vast French 
empire on the North American continent. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 saw the British take 
hold of New France and the Illinois country, while the Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762 had 
secretly passed control of Louisiana to Spain.37 In the aftermath, French inhabitants on 
either side of the Mississippi suddenly found themselves subjects of two competing 
empires. While the news of the imperial transfer to Spain took 2 years to reach the frontier 
of Louisiana, changes to the status quo were already underway. The imperial transition of 
the Illinois Country east of the Mississippi to British, saw the former French leaders of the 
region emigrate to St. Louis, recently founded in 1764. Following the French leaders were 
many French inhabitants looking to avoid British rule. These migrations showed the 
evolving relations between people on different sides of the river, and signalled a change to 
the region’s role in imperial politics.38 
The arrival of the Spanish in Louisiana brought a markedly different approach to the 
operation of the colony within the imperial sphere. The Spanish brought stricter economic 
policies, limited trade to only Spanish territories, and enforced more rigid Catholic 
                                                          
37 The Treaty of Paris required that France cede control of New France and the Illinois Country east of the 
Mississippi to Great Britain. The remainder of the Illinois Country west of the Mississippi, including New Orleans, 
was known as Louisiana. Louisiana was given to Spain to compensate for the loss of Florida to Great Britain. The 
French Crown was keen on keeping Bourbon Spain as an ally in the aftermath of the Seven Year’s War. Fausz, 
Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, 68; Patricia Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of 
Colonial St. Louis, 31; Colin G. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 8; Helen Dewar, "Canada or Guadeloupe?: French and British Perceptions of 
Empire, 1760–1783," Canadian Historical Review. 91, no.4 (December 2010): 637–660; Ekberg, Colonial St. 
Genevieve: An Adventure on the Mississippi Frontier, 51, 52; Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 2,16; Alvord, The Illinois 
Country 1673-1818, 262. 
38 Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 2010, 2,16; Frederick A. Hodes, Beyond the Frontier: A history of St. Louis to 1821 
(St. Louis: the Patrice Press, 2004), 45; Ekberg, Colonial St. Genevieve: An Adventure on the Mississippi Frontier, 52; 
Alvord, The Illinois Country, 262.  
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influence in the social realm. Spain’s imperial rivalry with Britain also saw the enactment of 
stringent security policies, which limited the traditional movement and trading practices of 
people within the colony, as well as those wishing to enter it.39 Spanish colonial 
administrators wanted to conduct the imperial business of Louisiana on their terms. They 
failed, however, to understand the intricacies and importance of the local economic 
situation that had developed under the markedly more relaxed French regime. 
 The French inhabitants resisted and appealed against many of the new economic, 
social, and security policies. Limiting trade to only Spanish colonies, stricter adherence to 
Catholic norms, and a more involved governing style upset the ruling merchant class of 
New Orleans, whose trading practices and travels to other French colonies had fueled the 
economic growth of the region. In 1768, the French residents of New Orleans rebelled 
against the Spanish colonial government, while those of Upper Louisiana peacefully 
resisted against the local Spanish Commandant.40 The resistance in Upper Louisiana was 
driven by the colony’s continued dependence on the trading activities of the local French 
merchants. Trade was the lifeblood of the colony. French merchants settled St. Louis in 
1764, for the development of the fur trade west of the Mississippi along the Missouri 
River.41 The French merchants were not aligned with the short-term goals of a far-off 
                                                          
39 While traditional movement and trade was officially limited, French traders and merchants continued to cross 
the newly constructed international boundaries in what Robert Englebert has termed a “French River World”. 
Instructions issued to Ríu for leading the expedition to the Illinois, March 14, 1767, AGI-PC, 2357-172, Missouri 
History Museum Library and Research Centre microfilm; Robert Englebert “Merchant Representatives and the 
French River World, 1763-1803.” Michigan Historical Review 34, no.1 (2008): 63-82; Ekberg, Colonial St. Genevieve: 
An Adventure on the Mississippi Frontier, 56; Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 17. 
40 Upper Louisiana was the section of the territory west of the Mississippi, and north of the Arkansas Rivers. 
41 The community was settled by Pierre Laclède, a native Frenchman, and Auguste Chouteau, his creole stepson, 
who had both previously lived in New Orleans. Foley. A History of Missouri, 1763 to 1820 Vol 1, 30; Cleary, The 
World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 33; Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the New 
West, 2011, 67; Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 16. 
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imperial government, but rather were motivated to increase their own wealth and fortunes 
in the region. The arrival of the Spanish in Upper Louisiana represented an initial clash of 
different understandings of governance. The French merchants did not like the new 
bureaucratic restriction placed upon their traditional trading practices. The French 
inhabitants also resented the lack of Spanish economic support and the lack Spanish 
military presence in the region.42  
 French Louisiana had failed to meet its potential as a prosperous colony and it was 
not surprising then that France secretly gave away the colony to Spain as a “gift” in the 
1762 Treaty of Fontainebleau.43 The Spanish accepted it as consolation for losing Florida to 
the British with the understanding that they could return it to the French in the future. In 
the meantime, the Spanish felt it could serve as a buffer between Mexico and the advancing 
British.44  
Correspondence between Spanish officials demonstrates the stricter policies they 
planned to institute in Louisiana. In a letter dated March 14, 1767, Antonio Ulloa, the first 
Spanish Governor of Louisiana instructed Captain Ríu, the first Spanish Commandant, to 
travel to and establish a presence in Upper Louisiana. Ríu was to construct a fort at the 
confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi rivers, and to maintain proper and timely 
communication with the Governor in New Orleans, and consequently maintain a tight link 
                                                          
42 Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 83. 
43 Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans. 67; Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the 
New West, 68; Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 31; Robert Michael 
Morrisey, Empire by Collaboration, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 169. 
44 Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, 68; Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of 
Colonial St. Louis, 31; Foley, A History of Missouri, 1763 to 1820 Vol 1, 30; Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 17. 
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with the imperial metropole.45 The Spanish were not going to leave the colony to its own 
vices. Ulloa also wished to avoid potential English Protestant incursions from the east and 
therefore sought to maintain the colony as a proper Catholic colony. He pushed for stricter 
adherence to Catholic values, such as limits on drinking alcohol, proper Church-sanctioned 
marital relations, and regular attendance of mass for French inhabitants, Spanish officials, 
and Spanish soldiers alike.46  
While the French inhabitants of St. Louis were Catholic, the Church had not had a 
major role in governing the social culture of the inhabitants as was seen in other Catholic 
colonies. A prime example was the general acceptance of Pierre Laclède’s spousal situation 
with his partner Marie-Thérèse Bourgeois Chouteau.47 Madame Chouteau’s husband, René 
Auguste Chouteau, had abandoned her and their children when he returned to France. 
Laclède and Madame Chouteau subsequently had four children together, but because 
divorce was prohibited under the Roman Catholic Church and by law in France, these 
children were baptized as the children of Madame Chouteau's legal husband and carried 
the Chouteau name.48 The community of St. Louis accepted the union and the offspring, 
something that would have been unthinkable if the church had had a stronger presence in 
the region. 
                                                          
45 Instructions issued to Ríu for leading the expedition to the Illinois, March 14, 1767, AGI-PC, 2357-172, Missouri 
History Museum Library and Research Centre microfilm. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Most people in St. Louis came from the Illinois Country, and Kaskaskia and Cahokia had been founded as mission 
communities to convert Indigenous peoples. After 1763 there were not many priests remaining, due in part to the 
recall and banishment of Jesuits from North America. Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of 
Colonial St. Louis, 83; Daniel Hechenberger, “The Jesuits: History and Impact: From Their Origins Prior to the 
Baroque Crisis to Their Role in the Illinois Country,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 100 no. 2 
(Summer: 2007): 93, 96-97. 
48 Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 30; Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City 
of the New West, 68; Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 19. 
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Governor Ulloa’s instructions to Ríu indicated that the Spanish wished to maintain 
the relationships that had existed in the region under the French, but he did not know what 
to expect in Upper Louisiana49 He tasked Ríu, an inexperienced officer, with formally taking 
possession of the region on behalf of the Spanish Crown. This decision was detrimental to 
Spanish goals in the region, and the Captain soon demonstrated that he did not have the 
necessary leadership and political skills to maintain good relations with his own men, let 
alone the local inhabitants.50 Ríu was clearly not prepared for the intricacies of dealing with 
the Indigenous groups or the local French populace. As the region had been left without 
much imperial oversight under the French, only the regional administration of the fur trade 
generated anything in terms of governance and oversight, and even that was mainly 
organised by the oligarchic Superior Council in New Orleans for their or their friends’ 
personal benefits.51  
In 1767, the French inhabitants of St. Louis grudgingly accepted the arrival of the 
Spanish Commandant, Captain Francisco Ríu. They seemed willing to work with Ríu if he 
did not interfere with the economic and social workings of the colony. However, trouble 
began soon after his arrival as the twenty men he brought with him to protect the colony 
and enforce the Governor’s policies did not respect Ríu and stopped following his orders.52 
                                                          
49 Ibid. 
50 Instructions issued to Ríu for leading the expedition to the Illinois, March 14, 1767, AGI-PC, 2357-172, Missouri 
History Museum Library and Research Centre microfilm. 
51 Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans, 221; Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the 
Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 32; Brasseaux, Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768, 
43; Brasseaux, “Confusion, Conflict, and Currency: An introduction to the Rebellion of 1768.” 164; Giraud. Histoire 
de La Louisiane Française vol. V, 168. 
52 Fed up with Ríu’s strict rules regarding alcohol and prayer, coupled with his lack of leadership skills, the Spanish 
contingent instead chose to follow the command of the sergeant of the expedition, who forced Ríu to remain in St. 
Louis rather than continuing further upriver to build a fort at the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. 
Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis. 83; Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of 
the New West, 68; Ekberg, Colonial St. Genevieve: An Adventure on the Mississippi Frontier. 52. 
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Ríu lacked the soldiers to implement new policies by force, and yet he naively attempted to 
implement new decrees based on the weight of imperial power alone. 
Spanish attempts to set limits on trade and the inexperience of Captain Ríu, 
especially in dealing with visiting Indigenous groups, began to interfere with the way the 
French inhabitants had managed their affairs in Upper Louisiana. French inhabitants 
openly resisted the new Spanish regime through public petitions delivered directly to the 
local Spanish Commandant.  French inhabitants throughout the former French empire in 
North America used petitions to raise concerns regarding the policies of new colonial 
governments.53 Catherine Carngany documents the use of petitions in early post-French 
Detroit. The French residents wanted to create a local arbitration system, rather than 
having to travel to courts in Montreal.54 Prior to the Louisiana Rebellion of 1768, local New 
Orleans inhabitants who were upset with the new Spanish trade policies similarly brought 
forward petitions to the Louisiana Superior Council. The petition asked for the Superior 
Council to confront the new Spanish Governor for them.55 
The French inhabitants of St. Louis delivered one such petition on May 8, 1768, 
which called for a ban on the sale of alcohol to Indigenous people within the settlement of 
St. Louis.  While Governor Ulloa did not want alcohol in the colony at all, Commandant Ríu 
had run out of more practical items to use as gifts for the Indigenous peoples who visited 
                                                          
53 Peter Moogk, “Notables, Rank, and Patronage: The Social Order of Early Eighteenth Century Canada,” 
Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society 13/14 (1990): 78; Bronwyn M. Craig, French 
Speakers, American Citizens: Government, Community, and Survival in the American Illinois Country, 1778-1787. 
(Masters Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2016), 31. 
54 Catherine Cangany, Frontier Seaport, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 117. 
55 The greater importance of the rebellion in New Orleans is discussed further in chapter two. However, the use of 
petitions at such an important event for the residents shows the weight with which they were deemed to have 
held in the community. Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans. 221. 
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St. Louis, and had turned to placating them with alcohol. The petition presented four 
reasons why the ban was needed: “disruption of trade and commerce; breakdown of public 
order and tranquility; threats to the safety of all citizens of the area, especially children; 
and the jeopardizing of religious practices, constituting an affront to morality and 
decency.”56 While the arguments put forward in the petition give insight into the regard 
with which the French held their Indigenous visitors, they clearly represent the interests of 
the French community. The potential for economic disruption in the region points to their 
priority of protecting the peace between themselves and their Indigenous trading partners, 
as well as the security of the settlement itself. In the late 1760s, St. Louis relied on 
Indigenous trading partners not only for economic survival, but also for physical 
protection. There was a fear among French inhabitants that alcohol fueled violence could 
spiral out of control, leading to a breakdown of local French-Indigenous relations, possibly 
ending in violent conflict.57  
Captain Ríu eventually agreed to the terms of the petition. However, St. Louis did not 
have adequate military personnel to enforce the alcohol ban, let alone effectively protect 
the settlement. The French inhabitants were aware of the lack of soldiers, and proposed in 
the petition that they would form a militia for enforcing the ban.58 Violators would be fined 
500 livres, and have their liquor confiscated. The petition was signed or marked by 88 
residents, representing a large portion of the population of St. Louis at the time.59 The 
                                                          
56 "Transcript of a 1768 petition to prohibit sale of alcohol to Indians in Illinois country,” American Indian Histories 
and Cultures. Vault Box Ayer MS 714, Newberry Library. 
57 Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 94. 
58 Militias were common place throughout New France, but one had not yet been established in St. Louis prior to 
the arrival of the Spanish. 
59 In the 1772 the population of St. Louis was 597 people, but would have been less in 1768. "Transcript of a 1768 
petition to prohibit sale of alcohol to Indians in Illinois country,” American Indian Histories and Cultures. Vault Box 
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French inhabitants knew there were risks involved with upsetting the economic and social 
balance of the settlement. The French inhabitants saw the protection and order of the 
settlement to be a community responsibility, rather than being left to an inexperienced 
foreign commander. The success of the petition demonstrated to the French inhabitants 
that they had some power to influence Spanish colonial governance in the region.  
At the end of May 1768, Antonio de Ulloa, the Spanish Governor in New Orleans, 
wished to impose Spanish administrative control over trade in Upper Louisiana. He 
ordered Captain Ríu to issue a decree that anyone wishing to trade along the Missouri River 
basin had to first travel to New Orleans, and visit Ulloa personally to receive a trading 
license.60 The St. Louis merchants were outraged at the idea of having to make such an 
arduous journey simply to acquire permission to trade in a region where they had been 
successfully operating for years. In response to the decree, French merchants presented 
another petition to Captain Ríu, describing the dangers of disrupting of trade with their 
Indigenous partners.61  
This second petition highlighted the threat that discontented Indigenous groups 
posed. The French merchants employed menacing language, referring to “the murmurings 
of the savages of the district of the Misuri and their evil intentions because of the lack of 
traders and merchandise of which they were deprived by the orders of the Spanish 
                                                          
Ayer MS 714, Newberry Library; Louis Houck, The Spanish Regime in Missouri, Vol 1, “First Spanish Detailed 
Statistical Report of Ste. Genevieve and St. Louis,” dated 1772 (Chicago: R. R. Donnelly and Sons, 1909), 53. 
60 Foley, Genesis of Missouri, 33; Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis. 93; 
Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, 67. 
61 A journey between New Orleans and St. Louis took on average 3-5 weeks, depending on the weather and 
direction. Ibid. 
29 
 
Governor.”62 The merchants claimed that “they [the Indigenous peoples] were on the point 
of executing their threats and the mischief which they were hatching against us [St. 
Louis].”63 The merchants also stated that the Indigenous peoples “had no other object than 
the destruction of all the French, if the sending of traders to them was postponed,” and that 
this had led to “the inhabitants [of St. Louis] already not cultivating their fields without 
terror.”64 The merchants were likely exaggerating the imminent threat that Indigenous 
peoples posed, and it is more likely that such hyperbolic language was meant to sway Ríu, 
whom the merchants deemed ignorant of French-Indigenous relations and fur trading 
activities.  
To appeal to Spanish imperial interests, the petition also played on the fears of an 
increase in British influence in the region. The document stated that “already were our 
neighbours [the British] rejoicing over a tragedy which they imagined as certain, and were 
counting those tribes among their allies, since some of the villages have already accepted 
their banner.”65 The petition was signed and marked by the most prominent merchants in 
St. Louis, including Pierre Laclède, the founder of St. Louis, and notarized by Joseph 
Labuxière, the former French attorney-general of the region.66 
This second petition again showed French resistance to Spanish policies, a 
resistance that was determined by the interests of the French St. Louis community and 
based upon notions of economic and physical survival. Their resistance was peaceful, 
                                                          
62 Houck, The Spanish Regime in Missouri, Vol 1, “Petition of the Merchants of St. Louis to Captain Ríu to be 
allowed to Trade on the Missouri, January 1769,” 37. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid, 38. 
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organized, and utilized their superior knowledge of the intricacies of the region to prove 
their point to the Spanish Commandant. The organized nature of their resistance was 
highlighted by the leadership and participation of prominent members of the community, 
such as Laclède and Labuxière. Ideals of local leadership and the goal of protecting their 
community governed the actions of French merchants and their approach to resisting the 
Spanish policies.67   
Louis Saint Ange de Bellerive, the former French Commandant of Upper Louisiana, 
made efforts to appeal directly to Governor Ulloa in New Orleans. As the former 
Commandant of Illinois Country, St. Ange had been in regular contact with former French 
administrators in New Orleans concerning issues of Governance. Under the Spanish, he 
maintained contact with Ulloa in an unofficial role, commenting on Captain Ríu’s progress 
and conduct. That the former French Commandant was encouraged to maintain contact 
directly with the Governor of Louisiana demonstrates the lack of confidence in Captain Ríu. 
In a letter to Governor Ulloa, St. Ange explained that the refusal of the French 
inhabitants to provide supplies to the Spanish was due to the new Spanish policy of limiting 
trade on the Missouri river by requiring merchants to apply for a trading license in New 
Orleans.68 St. Ange addressed how the new licensing policy would create trade disruptions 
that would directly affect the economic fortunes of local French merchants and undermine 
                                                          
67 Morrisey, Empire by Collaboration, University of Pennsylvania Press, 197. 
68 It was probably of great importance for St. Ange to maintain connections with Ulloa and the territorial 
government in the south, so as not to let the instability further interfere with the growth of the region’s economy, 
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official close to Ulloa, with whom St. Ange had regular correspondence, as he was likely the only one able to 
officially change the new policy. St. Ange to Unknown, AGI-PC 187A-397, Price Compilation, Missouri History 
Museum Library and Research Centre.  
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Spanish governance and authority in Upper Louisiana.69 Even if Ulloa was not sympathetic 
to the needs of the French merchants, St. Ange believed he would understand the necessity 
of providing ample supplies to the troops he had sent to secure Upper Louisiana70 
Following the French merchants’ refusal to continue supplying the Spanish Troops, 
the efforts of French petitioners and St. Ange were rewarded and Captain Ríu agreed to a 
compromise without approval from his superiors in New Orleans.71 Ríu changed the decree 
so that merchants were required visit him in St. Louis instead of travelling to New 
Orleans.72 While the situation did not totally favour the demands of the merchants, it 
allowed them to maintain their crucial trading relationships, and also allowed Ríu to adapt 
imperial policy to local needs and defuse a potentially volatile situation. 
The petitions show a community based approach for addressing local grievances 
regarding colonial policies. Prominent members of the community crafted the petitions, 
which in turn were signed by a large portion of the local population.73  French inhabitants 
took advantage of their superior numbers as the majority of the population, and used their 
knowledge of Indigenous trade and alliance to undermine Spanish policies. The French 
inhabitants influenced Spanish colonial polices through economic and community actions, 
                                                          
69 St. Ange to Unknown, AGI-PC 187A-397, Price Compilation, Missouri History Museum Library and Research 
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70 The letter also shows the lack of understanding that the Spanish had for the local economy of the region through 
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Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, 67. 
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as opposed to using violence or not engaging with the Spanish system of governance. This 
was not a struggle for empire or enlightenment ideals, but rather a means of allowing their 
tight-knit French community to prosper in the face of a changing imperial landscape.74 
The North American French colonies had relied on relationships with Indigenous 
peoples for economic prosperity and military protection. The practice was rooted in the 
traditional system of French/Native relations developed in Canada. This system was 
developed as a joint creation of French officials and traders and Indigenous peoples of the 
Great Lakes region, in what Richard White termed the “Middle Ground.” The middle ground 
depended on the inability of both sides to gain their ends through force, and therefore 
“involved a process of mutual invention.”75 This process enabled both parties to abide, 
prosper, and attempt to understand each other following Iroquois Wars of the seventeenth 
century. The French representative of the monarchy in North America assumed the role 
and title of father, while Indigenous groups assumed the role of children. The titular roles 
assumed by both sides encompassed the very notion of the middle ground, in that the 
French saw the father role as being patriarchal and authoritative, while the Indigenous 
groups saw the father as a benevolent provider who acted as a mediator between his 
children. As a member of the family, French had obligations to his children. A father could 
not do simply as he pleased, nor did he rule over the rest of his family. He had to provide 
for the family and convince them through discussion at council.76 
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The traditional father-child model of the relationship between the French colonists 
and Indigenous groups in Canada was extended to the development of the colony of 
Louisiana. However, in contrast to the Canadian experience, the French inhabitants of 
Upper Louisiana were even more dependent on local Indigenous groups, as the relied on 
the Indigenous groups for economic and physical security. DuVal terms this imbalanced 
power dynamic in favour of the Indigenous groups as the “Native Ground.”77 Notions of 
French-Indigenous alliance building travelled through the interior because of the flow of 
French inhabitants, merchants and goods between Louisiana, the Illinois Country and 
Canada, through a French river world.78 In 1766, after Louis Groston de Saint-Ange de 
Bellerive, the former French Commandant of the Illinois Country and Upper Louisiana, had 
been informed of the Spanish takeover of Louisiana, he documented the initial reaction of 
the local Indigenous trading partners to the news of the transition to the Spanish. In his 
first correspondence to the Spanish Governor Ulloa in New Orleans, St. Ange explained that 
he had presented the news of the change, and that Indigenous peoples, while having 
already been subject to British attempts to engage them, remained inclined towards the 
Spanish. St. Ange explained that he had persuaded Indigenous groups to see the Spanish as 
successors to the French, and that the King of Spain would simply supplant the King of 
France as their benevolent father.79 
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St. Ange’s speedy acknowledgement of the Spanish take-over of Upper Louisiana 
probably demonstrates that he was willing to work with the Spanish, while at the same 
time demonstrating his importance in dealing with the Indigenous peoples such as the 
Osages, Kanza, and Pawnee. It could also have been St. Ange’s attempt to show the Spanish 
that the region was worth investing in and protecting, as the Indigenous peoples were 
already willing trade partners, and had not been swayed by English advances. His letter 
also highlights that the Spanish had little prior knowledge of French-Indigenous relations 
or British influence in the region. The Spanish would have had little understanding of how 
the symbolic kinship relationship between Indigenous peoples and the French had 
functioned, and had a very different historical relationship with Indigenous peoples in New 
Spain.80  Thus, the Spanish did not immediately see the need to seek out a middle ground, 
let alone understand that the French settlements in Upper Louisiana were in fact highly 
dependent on trade with Indigenous peoples. In many of Spain’s other colonies, they had 
relied on coercion as the main tool for social control. As Louisiana was a mature colony 
with “a unique mix of non-Hispanic Euromericans, Indians, and people of African descent, 
the Spanish had to be flexible and conciliatory in adapting traditional Spanish 
institutions.”81 
In St. Louis in particular, the French inhabitants relied on the local Indigenous 
groups such as the Osage for trade, but also as a means of security in the face of the 
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encroaching British and other less friendly Indigenous groups.82 The French, and later the 
Spanish, were forced to bend to many of the demands of the local Indigenous groups, as the 
threat of them simply shifting their trading habits to the British would be enough to 
severely limit the physical and economic growth of the settlement and region. Prior to the 
arrival of the Spanish in Upper Louisiana, the French inhabitants were required to provide 
gifts to their Indigenous trading partners to show the importance of the relationship. 
French traders would travel between the various groups acquiring and trading goods, and 
then periodically throughout the year, each of the different groups expected to meet the 
local Governor or Commandant to receive gifts.83 
The Spanish brought stricter trade policies and did not understand the traditional 
system of trade and alliance that the French had developed with Indigenous groups. This 
was especially true of trade intricacies, which developed over generations. While Ulloa 
gave instructions to the first Spanish contingent to reach Upper Louisiana on how they 
were supposed to deal with their new Indigenous partners, they were not told how to deal 
with complex issues of Native-Newcomer relations other than to follow the successful 
procedures that the French had established. Under the French, the Indigenous groups were 
received in council at a pre-arranged time, at which point they would receive gifts. While 
waiting, some of the Indigenous groups were permitted to trade furs with the local traders. 
Sometimes Indigenous groups presented scalps as gifts to the council, but the Commandant 
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would only accept scalps of warriors whose nations were at war with the French. The 
Commandant had to do his outmost to try to establish peace among the warring Indigenous 
groups allied with the French.84  While the Spanish newcomers were not familiar with 
these protocols, imperial instructions were very clear that Spanish officials and soldiers 
were not to berate or anger visiting Indigenous groups.85 This approach called for greater 
cooperation between the French inhabitants and the new Spanish Commandant. However, 
there remained a lot of ambiguity as to how the Spanish Commandant Ríu was to deal with 
the challenges of Native-Newcomer encounters. Governor Ulloa’s letter lists only the 
hypothetical prospect of a chief against whom charges had been brought, not being allowed 
to trade in St. Louis or receive any further gifts.86 Ríu was not a skilled leader and relied 
heavily on the help of the leading French inhabitants. In fact, he was so reliant on the 
French that one could argue that Commandant held only nominal power, and simply acted 
as the mouthpiece for Governor Ulloa. 
The Spanish wished to continue the traditional trading practices established by the 
French, however, they had trouble understanding the more nuanced details and specificity 
of the trade. Ríu noted in a letter to Governor Ulloa, that French merchants had informed 
him that Indigenous groups were used to getting their rum in smaller sized barrels, like 
those the French made, rather than the larger ones, which the Spanish provided. Ríu 
requested that a cooper trained in the French style of barrel making be sent to St. Louis. 
The closest cooper who could make the French sized barrels lived on the east side of the 
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Mississippi, and to have him make them was too costly. The smallest barrels at four and a 
half pots costs six French livres, which he stated amounted to robbery.87 Ríu also asked that 
they be sent more rum and trade goods to use as gifts for Indigenous groups who would 
begin to converge on St. Louis in early March 1768. Ríu had no rum left in the storehouse, 
and he noted that shipping the rum north from New Orleans would be much cheaper than 
acquiring it locally in Upper Louisiana for 100 pesos per barrel. 
Ríu catered to the demands of the French merchants, who in turn catered to the 
Indigenous groups who travelled to St. Louis for gifts. Ríu was adamant that he was trying 
to reduce the costs of the gift giving process, as per Ulloa’s initial instructions. Ríu’s efforts 
to streamline the efficiency of the gift giving process showed the pressure he was under to 
meet the Spanish colonial goal of reducing the costs of maintaining good relations with 
Indigenous groups and the French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana. While Ríu asked 
Governor Ulloa for more rum and goods may have demonstrated the logistical trials of 
communicating and sending trade goods along the Mississippi for the Spanish, it also 
showed Ríu’s incompetence as a leader. It also points to Ulloa’s lack of foresight involved in 
initially choosing him to command in St. Louis. It is interesting to note that Ríu asked a 
cooper to be sent to St. Louis to make the local barrel sizes, and as well that buying local 
rum was not an option. While it is possible that this could have simply been the local 
market price, the price could also have reflected French merchants trying to exploit the 
unorganized Spanish newcomers. Locals may have been demanding exaggerated prices 
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because they knew the Spanish did not have the means to locally acquire them on their 
own without factoring in the costs and efforts of shipping from the south. 
The French inhabitants were unhappy with the lack of imperial support St. Louis 
was receiving from the Spanish, especially the regular shortfall of supplies and gifts for 
maintaining good relations with Indigenous peoples. While French inhabitants in Upper 
Louisiana had been generally left to their own devices under the French regime, they had 
enjoyed material support regarding gifts for visiting Indigenous groups. They wished for 
this practice to continue under the Spanish, but they still wanted to be left on their own 
politically. The French inhabitants also believed that the Spanish were not helping enough 
with protecting their trade interests from encroaching British traders. Prior to the end of 
the Seven Years’ War, the east side of the Mississippi had also belonged to the French. The 
arrival of ethnically French traders from the new British Illinois Country was a new 
development.88 The Spanish had to deal with this new phenomenon. Ríu recounted to Ulloa 
how French merchants had told him that a Peoria chief was unhappy with the gifts the 
Spanish provided, and that they were inferior to those of the British.89 While French 
merchants may have exaggerated the claims of the Peoria, the weight of the message 
clearly resonated with Ríu. It is possible that the chief could have been looking to play 
imperial rivals against each other for his people’s own benefit. Regardless, Ríu’s reported 
the concerns to Ulloa.  These concerns illustrated the fears of the French merchants that the 
Spanish would not adhere to the usual standard of gifts.  There was a legitimate fear that 
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British trade would erode not only the economic relationship that was the life blood of the 
settlement, but could also compromise its security, due to their reliance on trade to keep 
their Indigenous allies satisfied. French merchants feared increased English influence west 
of the Mississippi, and Ríu and Ulloa shared those concerns. 
Just as fear of British encroachment on trade played into the perceptions of how the 
French inhabitants of St. Louis viewed the new policies of the incoming Spanish, so too did 
instances in which the physical security of individuals and the settlement were threatened. 
The French reacted especially strong to the events of July 2nd, 1767, when a British officer 
named Ancrevum journeyed across the river with a contingent of soldiers to steal black 
slaves. In the middle of the heist, the British soldiers fired upon local French residents. 
Ancrevum was the English commanding officer at Kaskaskia, a settlement on the east side 
of the Mississippi, and therefore would have been somewhat aware of the delicate nature of 
border politics.90 Ancrevum’s detachment of troops hid while he called to Sieur Thelier, a 
French merchant with whom he had arranged a meeting. Thelier thought he had come to 
purchase salt, and sent 3 other men to conduct business: 2 black slaves, and an English 
volontaire who was an employee. Upon Ancrevum’s arrival at the spot where the French 
inhabitants and the slaves were situated, the 2 slaves and the English worker were 
arrested, to be taken under escort to Kaskaskia. Ancrevum was not finished, however, and 
called again to Thelier. Thelier worried that something had happened to the first group of 
men, so he sent one of his relatives, Mr. Pages, and a black slave belonging to Mr. Datcherut. 
The two men were also arrested, although Pages managed to free himself and fled. 
                                                          
90 Letter from St. Ange to Ulloa, July 2nd, 1767, AGI-PC, 109-989, Missouri History Museum Library and Research 
Centre microfilm. 
40 
 
Ancrevum’s group of British soldiers fired upon him as he ran, but Pages survived the 
encounter.  
The entire incident had a profound impact. French merchants’ faith in the security of 
the region was shaken, as Ancrevum had come across the Mississippi under the pretence of 
looking for ‘English deserters.’ St. Ange took the issue up and sent Picote de Belestre to ask 
for justice from the British commander at Fort Chartres, Lieutenant-Colonel John Reed. St. 
Ange received little response beyond being told that Ancrevum had followed Reed’s orders, 
and the British would continue to use all strategies available to them to capture deserters 
in Spanish territory.91 St. Ange commented in his correspondence with Governor Ulloa that 
it was not the French or Spanish who were the cause of the desertions, and that fault lay 
with the British and the widespread mistreatment of their own troops. St. Ange stated that 
more soldiers were needed to act as a deterrent to future English incursions.92 The letter 
illustrates that the English were not afraid of crossing the Mississippi into Spanish 
territory. St. Ange was clearly worried about this development and saw the need for the 
arrival of more men to help protect the border. As the Spanish had not yet sent more 
soldiers, their priorities did not lie with preventing British incursions before they had 
begun. The local inhabitants viewed this as the Spanish shirking their responsibilities to 
protect the well-being of the locals and prevent British aggression. While the Spanish were 
more concerned about the economic challenges of the new territory, the dissent with which 
the French inhabitants responded to the outside threats of British incursions and 
discontented Indigenous allies also caused to the Spanish to begin to see the potential for 
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internal threats within the St. Louis settlement.93 Fauz has argued that a harmonious three-
way relationship was maintained between the French inhabitants, the Spanish, and the 
local Indigenous groups in early St. Louis.94 While the Spanish had so far been able to 
maintain a general peace amongst the various groups who lived and frequented St. Louis, it 
was not so much a result of their own efforts, but rather due to the interventions of the 
local French inhabitants. The lack of local knowledge demonstrated by the Spanish created 
tensions with local French Inhabitants. Incursions by marauding British troops and 
merchants to the west side of the Mississippi undermined the idea that the three-way 
relationship always remained solid and stable. 
The French inhabitants of St. Louis and Upper Louisiana were not used to the hands-
on approach that the Spanish authorities took to colonial governance. Spanish imperial 
authorities were not prepared for unique local situation that they encountered in 
Louisiana. The French inhabitants were used to a system of self-governance, overseen by 
local trusted elders and statesmen, and so peacefully resisted the changes which the 
Spanish tried to impose on them, using petitions. The petitions allowed locals to voice their 
concerns without resorting to open rebellion in the face of changes that they did not agree 
with. The French inhabitants were also concerned with the lack of knowledge the Spanish 
leaders possessed and practiced when it came to deal with the Indigenous groups with 
whom the locals traded, and as well with the encroachment of British traders from the east. 
The Spanish seemed oblivious to traditional ways of trading that the French had developed 
over generations. The French inhabitants worried these lapses in security would lead to 
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outright violence or defections from the Indigenous groups. The French inhabitants 
believed that if the Spanish were going to govern the region properly, then they needed to 
provide more protection and assurances regarding the advancing British. While the French 
did not agree with the Spanish, they used knowledge, and the power of a united community 
to help change the direction of Spanish imperial policy in the region. 
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Chapter 2: Infiltration: Reaction to the Louisiana Rebellion of 1768 
The French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana did not have the same level of 
resentment towards Spanish rule as the people of Lower Louisiana. There was no northern 
equivalent to the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768. The inhabitants of Upper Louisiana 
maintained a certain respect for the rule of Spanish law, but they did not see the early 
Spanish commanders of the region to be legitimate local leaders. Instead, they looked to 
former French colonial officials and local leaders for direction.  
While the Spanish Empire took control of Upper Louisiana in 1766, the nature of its 
location on the North American imperial frontier made it difficult for the Spanish to exert 
any meaningful cultural or political influence over the French inhabitants who lived there.  
Under the French regime, traders and bureaucrats had established distinctly French 
institutions and culture, which remained relatively intact through the early introduction of 
Spanish rule.95 The best example of this lack of transformation was the role of former 
French Commandant of the Illinois Country, Louis Groston de Saint-Ange de Bellerive. The 
French inhabitants continued to bring their grievances to St. Ange, rather than the new 
Spanish leaders.96 With St. Ange acting as arbiter for local French grievances and disputes, 
the French assert their interest and maintain some of the traditional customs of 
governance that had existed in French Illinois for decades. Eventually the Spanish colonial 
officials realized the importance of local leaders and agreed to integrate them into the new 
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regime. The trust and respect between the French people and St. Ange enabled a more 
stable transition of imperial power. By St. Ange’s death in 1774, local French leaders had 
helped the Spanish to establish a functional and respected government and garrison in 
Upper Louisiana.97 
Born in Canada in 1700 to a French officer and his wife, St. Ange continued in the 
family tradition of serving in the imperial French military.98 He worked his way through the 
ranks of the military, having spent time on trade and diplomatic expeditions up the 
Missouri and into the trans-Mississippi West. St. Ange was eventually promoted to 
Lieutenant and given command of the trading post at Vincennes. Having proved adept at 
managing relations between Indigenous groups while on expeditions and as commander at 
Vincennes, he was promoted to what would become the last French Commandant of the 
French Illinois Country at Fort de Chartres.99 With the transfer of French lands east of the 
Mississippi to the British in 1763, St. Ange was ordered to relocate his garrison and any 
willing French inhabitants to the newly founded settlement of St. Louis on the west side of 
the River. St. Ange was to remain in his post as Commandant until the Spanish came to take 
possession of the region and relieve him of duty.100 
Throughout this early period of Spanish rule, St. Ange remained the political leader 
of the French inhabitants at St. Louis. The French inhabitants saw St. Ange as the 
                                                          
97 Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 17; Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, 69; Cleary, The World, the 
Flesh, and the Devil: A History of Colonial St. Louis, 31; Foley, A History of Missouri, 1763 to 1820 Vol 1, 29. 
98 Ekberg and Person, St. Louis Rising: The French Regime of Louis St. Ange de Bellerive, 2015, 73. 
99 St. Ange served as commander of Fort d’Orleans on the Missouri from 1727 to 1736. He served there during the 
Fox war, when the Foxes, an Indigenous group opposed to French expansion, conflicted with some of France’s 
Indigenous allies. Ekberg and Person, St. Louis Rising: The French Regime of Louis St. Ange de Bellerive, 2015, 25, 
26. 
100  Fausz, Founding St. Louis: First City of the New West, 70; Cleary, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil: A History of 
Colonial St. Louis, 30; Foley. A History of Missouri, 1763 to 1820 Vol 1, 30. 
45 
 
embodiment of imperial authority in the region, even after the official Spanish takeover of 
the region. This was especially evident with the arrival of Spanish commander, Francisco 
Ríu in 1766, who tried to impose trade limits and failed to grasp the intricacies of managing 
relations with local Indigenous groups. Early in Captain Ríu’s tenure in St. Louis, the French 
inhabitants brought forth the petitions mentioned in the previous chapter. These petitions 
highlighted the leadership role St. Ange maintained, as the petitions were addressed to St. 
Ange, who then brought up the issues and conflicts with Ríu and Governor Ulloa.101 The 
French inhabitants’ reluctance to acknowledge the leadership of Ríu may not have been 
altogether due to his role as a Spanish official, but also because of his lack of leadership 
skills. Prior to his arrival in St. Louis, Ríu had lost the respect of his own men, who mostly 
ignored Ríu and answered instead to the company sergeant.102 The Spanish soldiers left Ríu 
in St. Louis with St. Ange, and did not allow him to accompany them to build the fort on the 
mouth of the Missouri.103 Ríu’s incompetence left a power vacuum for local imperial 
leadership, a role which St. Ange had trained for his whole life and had previously filled 
under the French regime. 
Not only did St. Ange act as the leader of the French inhabitants, but he also tried to 
help counsel Ríu, Ulloa, and later Lieutenant Governor Pedro Piernas on the local 
intricacies to which they were not accustomed. He explained the necessity of gift giving to 
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Captain Ríu to maintain relations with the Indigenous groups people who visited St. Louis. 
Once per year, various Indigenous peoples would descend upon St. Louis to receive gifts 
from imperial officials. The local officials were acting as the intermediary for the ruling 
monarch, whom the Indigenous groups saw as their father, a fictive kin relationship with 
mutual responsibilities.104 This was a vital practice to maintaining good relations with the 
local Indigenous groups upon who St. Louis relied on for economic and military support. St. 
Ange’s helped to temper Captain Ríu’s administrative incompetence. It was left to St. Ange 
to maintain good relations with the local Indigenous groups as Ríu had a hard time 
managing the gift giving process. He lacked the necessary goods for gifts, resorting to 
providing only bread and corn, and was annoyed that “there can be no fixed rule in the 
method of making presents to them, as they are given according to circumstances, which 
mediate among them.”105 St. Ange’s value was seen not only by the local French inhabitants 
as their way to voice their needs to the Spanish, but also by the Spanish as they began to 
understand the local customs of the region.  
St. Ange’s role as an intermediary between the French inhabitants of St. Louis and 
the Spanish administrators of the region began almost immediately upon the arrival of Ríu 
in Upper Louisiana. Ríu and his contingent of Spanish soldiers arrived in Ste. Genevieve 
first before making their way further north to St. Louis. François Vallé, the Captain of the 
militia and judge, and Phillipe-Rastel de Rochblave, the Commandant of Ste. Genevieve, 
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immediately recognized the discord that existed between Ríu and his men.106 Vallé sent 
word to St. Ange in St. Louis and warned him of the conflict and near mutiny that had 
occurred. St. Ange was thus able to prepare for Ríu’s arrival in St. Louis. Vallé’s warning to 
St. Ange enabled him to receive Ríu with a degree of dignity by welcoming him properly as 
a Spanish official. St. Ange understood the need to let Ríu remain in St. Louis, arranging for 
him to stay at Pierre Laclède’s house.107 
St. Ange also had an important role in diffusing tensions brought about by the day-
to-day activities of the local inhabitants and the Spanish soldiers. One such incident 
occurred on March 1, 1768, when St. Ange petitioned Captain Ríu on behalf of a French 
farmer whose cattle had been taken by a group of unruly Spanish soldiers. The soldiers 
were using the cattle for races and games and had threatened the farmer with violence.108 
St. Ange’s efforts, along with what little authority Ríu still held in the eyes of his men, 
proved enough to resolve the conflict. The cattle were returned to the French owner and 
the soldiers were sent back to their posting at the fort on the Missouri.109 This incident 
helped to confirm the local French inhabitants’ decision to trust St. Ange to advocate on 
their behalf for the betterment of the settlement. 
Another pragmatic local French leader in the region was François Vallé, the Captain 
of the militia at Ste. Genevieve. French colonists from Canada and the Illinois Country 
founded Ste. Genevieve in 1735; it was one of the first organized European settlements 
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west of the Mississippi River in North America. The Spanish decided to make St. Louis the 
capital of Upper Louisiana, because proximity to the mouth of the Missouri River. Ste. 
Genevieve, however, had a much larger population during the first few years of Spanish 
rule. Ste. Genevieve also had a prosperous agricultural industry, something which St. Louis 
lacked during its early years.110 While St. Louis would eventually grow to eclipse its 
neighbouring town to the south, St. Genevieve’s early growth and prosperity meant that it 
maintained a position of great importance in the management of the region. Vallé, as 
Captain of the militia and a respected local leader, therefore maintained great influence and 
favour with the Spanish Governors.111 
François Vallé, a Canadian by birth, moved to the Illinois country in the early 1740s. 
Having started out as a simple labourer, he expanded his activities into agriculture, mining, 
and trade with Indigenous groups. By the mid-1760s he had become the wealthiest person 
in Upper Louisiana. Because of his respected position in St. Genevieve, as well as his wealth, 
he was able to influence the incoming Spanish administration. The nature of the frontier 
meant that the Spanish troops in the region frequently lacked the necessary goods and 
money to enforce their will, and so the local Spanish officials regularly required loans and 
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goods from Vallé.112 Vallé managed to convince local French inhabitants to provide a 
hospitable welcome for arriving Spanish troops, and even arranged for Ríu to stay in his 
own house, before the Spaniard moved on to St. Louis.113 In a letter to Ulloa in 1767, Ríu 
commented on the welcome reception he had received in St. Genevieve from the whole 
town, and singled out Vallé as a being an upstanding host.114 The gesture and efforts shown 
by Vallé ingratiated the militia Captain to Ulloa and helped secure future official roles in the 
new administration. 
 In the months leading up to the rebellion in New Orleans in 1768, Governor Ulloa 
recognized the growing tensions between Ríu and French inhabitants throughout Upper 
Louisiana. Such tensions, combined with Ríu’s own requests to be relieved, convinced Ulloa 
of the need for a more astute administrator, and the Governor decided to appoint Don 
Pedro Piernas to replace be Ríu as Commandant at St. Louis.115 Piernas made the journey 
from New Orleans to Upper Louisiana, stopping in Ste. Genevieve, where he received much 
the same warm welcome from Vallé as accorded Ríu three years earlier. Upon his arrival in 
St. Louis, Piernas set about taking command from Ríu. His initial report to Ulloa confirmed 
Ríu’s incompetence. He found the council of the settlement wishing “to lay an embargo on 
the effects of the king” on behalf of four private traders.116 These traders were owed debts 
incurred by the former Spanish storekeeper to furnish and sustain the fort. The 
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storekeeper had fled before repaying them. The traders therefore wished for their 
payments to be seized from the royal stores without official permission.  Piernas found the 
situation to be a “novelty”, as the debt had occurred under Ríu’s command, but Ríu claimed 
to have no knowledge of the situation. Piernas was amazed by Ríu’s incompetence, and the 
boldness of the French council.117 The council was ready to penalize Ríu personally and sell 
goods belonging to the Spanish crown to pay the debts, and Ríu was ready to accept this. 
Piernas refused to allow Ríu to accept the punishment and asked St. Ange “as first judge of 
the council and military superior to protect our right, sustain the right of the Spanish 
nation, and have the respect due the interests of the monarch guarded, of which I made him 
responsible.”118 St. Ange agreed to suspend the recommendation and end the embargo, in 
exchange for a guarantee that the debts would be paid in the future.  
 Piernas’ first actions in St. Louis proved him to be a better colonial official than Ríu 
had been over the previous two years. Piernas must have recognized that St. Ange 
remained the local authority and had the acumen to appeal to him directly as a loyal 
imperial servant. St. Ange’s decision to end the embargo may not have been in the 
immediate interest of the French merchants, but he probably realized that Piernas was a 
more experienced official, and that this was not an issue worth provoking the Spanish over. 
St. Ange’s decision to appease Piernas would prove to be a shrewd maneuver, as events 
would conspire to force Piernas and St. Ange to work together again in the future.  
Piernas had barely settled in St. Louis when orders arrived from the south for him to 
hand control of the region back to St. Ange, and for him and his fellow Spaniards to return 
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to New Orleans. The French inhabitants of New Orleans had rebelled against the Spanish 
and forced Governor Ulloa to flee to Cuba.119 While Piernas’ arrival in St. Louis was 
overshadowed by the uprising in New Orleans, his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor 
and return to St. Louis following the reestablishment Spanish rule in Louisiana marked a 
turning point in the relations between Imperial Spain and local French inhabitants of Upper 
Louisiana. Armed with a new strategy to work with the French inhabitants, Piernas 
replaced Ríu’s incompetence with more judicious authority. 
 Following the rebellion, Alejandro O’Reilly was briefly appointed as Governor of 
Louisiana. His appointment began a process of working with and officially incorporating 
local French inhabitants into the administrative structure of the colony. Through the more 
effective leadership of O’Reilly, Piernas, and later Governor Luis Unzaga, the Spanish 
changed how they addressed the local population in Louisiana. They spent considerable 
time and resources to reassure the French inhabitants of their commitment to govern 
differently. To preserve the peace that had followed the abrupt end of the rebellion, and to 
account for increased tensions in the future, the Spanish began to take into consideration 
local customs. Compromise and education became the key themes of how the Spanish 
administrators were to proceed.  
By royal decree, O’Reilly created the office of Lieutenant-Governor of Upper 
Louisiana and appointed Pedro Piernas to the position, effectively and officially ending St. 
Ange’s role as Commandant. This sent a strong message about Spanish intentions in Upper 
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Louisiana. 120 However, in the spirit of compromise, recognition of his experience and the 
stabilizing role he fulfilled, O’Reilly also created the post of special advisor for St. Ange. The 
new position allowed St. Ange to remain officially involved in the workings of the regional 
government. O’Reilly made a point of including this as an item in the general list of 
instructions he decreed for St. Louis and St. Genevieve following the rebellion: 
The Lieutenant-Governor shall preserve the best of relations with 
Monsieur de Santo Ange, whose practical knowledge of the Indians will be 
very useful to him. He shall do whatever he can to gain his friendship and 
confidence, shall listen to his opinion attentively on all matters, and shall 
condescend to him so far as possible without prejudice to the service.121  
 
O’Reilly wrote to thank St. Ange for his service, and to inform him that he was to 
receive extra recompense for his efforts.122 In a separate letter to Piernas, O’Reilly ordered 
Piernas to work with St. Ange. After their first meeting Piernas was not impressed with St. 
Ange and the attempt of the council to secure the debts from Ríu. Piernas saw St. Ange as 
having tried to take advantage of an incompetent and weak Ríu, as the expense of the 
crown. Consequently, O’Reilly ordered Piernas to respect St. Ange’s knowledge and advice 
in dealing with the local French populations and Indigenous groups.123 St. Ange’s 
acceptance of his post as special advisor marked the end of an era. Here was a former 
French Commandant accepting a role within the government of a foreign empire. The St. 
Ange family had served the French crown for generations and Louis St. Ange had himself 
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spent most of his life in service to that crown. He now shifted allegiance and adapted to the 
changes in imperial geo-politics. 
One of O’Reilly’s first actions after re-appointing Piernas was to issue a thirty-point 
code of general instructions by which colonial officials at St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve were 
to abide. 124 The first point of the code showed the dramatic shift in Spanish priorities in 
Upper Louisiana following the unrest in New Orleans. The code stated the primary 
objectives were for “the dominion and government of His Majesty be loved and respected; 
justice be administered promptly, impartially, and according to the laws; and that 
commerce be protected and increased as much as possible.125 The first point’s focus, that 
“the King greatly desires the happiness of his vassals” shows the importance O’Reilly 
placed on keeping the peace with the local inhabitants, and that their tolerance for the new 
regime needed to be addressed.126 The inclusion of commerce is also telling, as not only did 
the Spanish wish Louisiana to be profitable, but they now also recognized the importance 
of French merchants in securing the stability of the region.  
The code was also a directive by which the traders of Upper Louisiana had to abide. 
For example, the instructions included placing an embargo on, and prosecuting any trader 
who ventured to the east side of the Mississippi to trade. No trader shall be permitted to 
enter the villages of Indians who inhabit His Majesty's territory, “unless the commandant 
has good reports concerning his conduct; but the Commandant shall not refuse his license 
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to anyone who shall be recognized as an honest man.”127 This code was a means by which 
French traders and the Imperial Governors could understand each other’s needs and 
positions. The instructions provided a clear list of Spanish regulations, but more than 
before, it accounted for and respected the local trade customs. The list also outlined the 
processes and mechanisms which would be followed should any issues arise with the 
regulations. The result was that French merchants could be assured that they would have a 
means by which to raise grievances and appeal rulings, and that the rulings would be fair 
and consistent.  
O’Reilly’s tenure as Governor also acknowledged preserving other local customs in 
Upper Louisiana. There was a compromise on the issue of religion. Originally, Ulloa’s vision 
for Louisiana was a very strict interpretation of Louisiana as a Catholic colony and 
regulations to enforce religious adherence. This included limiting alcohol consumption, 
emphasizing the importance of the church, and regular attendance of local inhabitants at 
mass.128 O’Reilly recognized the status quo that had existed under the French regime, 
whereby: 
The King of France, left the province in complete and absolute liberty, 
subject to nothing but the laws, manifesting its allegiance in no other way 
than by accepting the king's appointment of the judges, and controlled by 
no other customs than those of Paris. So long as a settler was, diligent, and 
laborious, he was inconvenienced by no exactions. Religious opinions were 
tolerated in order that disputes on such topics might not embarrass the 
development and progress of the settlement of the country.129  
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O’Reilly decided to allow the less strict Catholic practices of the colony to continue, 
although he still upheld an early Spanish order to expel Jews and Protestants from the 
colony.130 As the Spanish quickly discovered, strict adherence to Catholic dogma was not 
necessary for the prosperity and peace of the colony. 
 The resolve of O’Reilly’s successor, Governor Luis de Unzaga Y Amezaga, to 
adjudicate religious issues was soon tested. The French inhabitants of Ste. Genevieve sent a 
petition to Piernas who then sought advice from Unzaga. The petitioners took issue with 
the actions of Father Hillaire, the local priest. The inhabitants were upset that Father 
Hillaire attempted to unilaterally increase tithes upon them. The petition argued that the 
increase was too large and would bankrupt some of the parishioners. Moreover, it stated 
that it was scandalous for a religious person who had only been in the village for a few 
years, and who had “given no instruction to the children or preached a sermon, or given an 
exhortation to his parishioners” would now be attempting to impose hardship upon 
them.131 Father Hillaire then testified that he needed the increased funds to maintain his 
ministry, and that he should also be given a slave to help with upkeep.132 Unzaga stood by 
O’Reilly’s policy for religious tolerance and looked to local precedence in regards to tithes. 
The Lieutenant-Governor sided with the petitioners against the priest, forbidding Father 
Hillaire from increasing the tithes.133  
In the same spirit of cooperation and compromise, O’Reilly directly addressed 
merchant fears regarding the previously imposed restrictive trade policies in Upper 
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Louisiana. O’Reilly wrote a public letter to the merchants in which he reassured them that 
his duty was to increase economic activity, not to halt it. He stated that he had conferred 
the same orders to the commanders of the various posts, and that he would only send 
people of good conduct to administer the posts. He concluded the letter by wishing that 
good faith be established between both sides.134 O’Reilly’s overtures to the merchants 
recognized their importance to the prosperity of the region. O’Reilly confirmed his promise 
to appoint commanders of good conduct.135 St. Ange was to remain in an advisory position 
in St. Louis. Jean François Allain II was appointed commander of Point Coupée. 136 A 
respected former French Colonel, he was awarded a sword of honour for bravery at the 
Battle of Fontenoy in 1745, during the War of Austrian Succession. Allain had finished his 
career as Commandant of the Attakapas Post and subsequently established himself as 
a planter in Pointe Coupée.137  Former French Captain Francois Desmazellières was 
appointed commander of the Arkansas post.138 As the post’s Commandant under the 
French, he had had success in managing relations between the Quapaw and Osage in the 
region.139 François Vallé was made special Lieutenant of Ste. Genevieve.140 The three latter 
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appointments were also given the authority to act as the word of justice in their 
jurisdiction. The appointment all four of these men of French ethnicity shows how O’Reilly 
was serious about appointing locally respected leaders. O’Reilly was willing to bring former 
French officers into the Spanish colonial government structure for the sake of peace and in 
recognition of their local expertise. 
The appointment of French officials, the promotion of economic local activities, and 
less Spanish involvement in religious matters led the French inhabitants to see Spanish 
authority as more legitimate, and in line with their own sense of justice. Meanwhile, the 
French inhabitants began to share concerns over the security of the colony from threats 
from the British, which included threats from French inhabitants living in British imperial 
territory. Relations among French inhabitants changed as people picked imperial sides, 
causing the social connections which had extended across the river began to weaken, and 
in some cases fracture. 
Debruisseau, the King’s former storekeeper in St. Louis from 1766 to 1770, who had 
fled at the time of Piernas’ arrival in St. Louis, thought that he would be arrested on charges 
of embezzlement of money and goods from the imperial storehouse.141 Sources differ on 
whether Debruisseau had actually stolen from the storehouse, or if Piernas was in fact 
going to arrest him on his arrival. What the sources do provide is insight into how law and 
order in St. Louis transitioned from the authority of St. Ange and Labuxière to Piernas, and 
the process that unfolded in their combined efforts to find Debruisseau and uncover his 
motive for fleeing. 
                                                          
141 Ekberg and Person, St. Louis Rising: The French Regime of Louis St. Ange de Bellerive, 170. 
58 
 
On May 14, 1770, Debruisseau was reported to have fled, and St. Ange and 
Labuxière investigated the situation. They went to Debruisseau’s home to find that he had 
taken most of his personal goods, but they did their due diligence in taking an inventory of 
all that remained in the storehouse. They then posted seals on the doors and left guards to 
watch the building should he attempt to return.142 The two elder officials then set about 
gathering testimony from the last person to have had an interaction with Debruisseau. In 
their interview with Joseph Segond, they learned that a few days earlier a merchant named 
Blouin from the British side of the river had come to get Debruisseau to pay for six oxen, 
four cows, and two heifers which Blouin had sold him. Debruisseau could not pay and so 
Blouin took possession of the animals. However, Blouin could not get the animals back 
across the river and so he proposed selling them to Segond. Segond did not purchase them, 
but agreed to take care of them as if they were his own until Blouin could retrieve them.143 
Segond did not explain how exactly Blouin’s repossession of farm animals was connected to 
Debruisseau’s disappearance. The next source to expand on Debruisseau’s disappearance is 
a letter from Blouin to Debruisseau dated June 24, more than a month after he fled. Blouin 
informed Debruisseau that his disappearance caused a lot of gossip, and that a detachment 
of soldiers had been sent after him. Debruisseau was told that he was fortunate not to have 
been caught. Blouin informed the former royal storekeeper that all his goods were 
confiscated, even the animals which he was to return to Blouin. Blouin urged him to get 
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further away as soon as he could. When things had quieted down, he would send 
Debruisseau some goods he had asked for, but not before autumn.144 
 The real reason Debruisseau fled, as well as how Blouin was involved remained a 
mystery, until January 7, 1771, when Debruisseau, having returned to St. Louis, testified 
about the whole ordeal. Piernas had taken command of the region by this point and 
Debruisseau was captured and made prisoner. Debruisseau confessed that he had fled 
because of Piernas’ impending arrival in St. Louis. He believed Piernas was coming to arrest 
him because letters of exchange he had issued were being protested in New Orleans. 
Debruisseau explained that Robert, a habitant from the east side of the river, had provided 
this information in the form of an unsigned letter. The letter instructed Debruisseau to go 
to an Indigenous village outside of St. Louis the next day, where the letter’s author would 
meet him and give him another letter.145 Debruisseau stated that he was told to bring 
paper, pen, ink, and tools needed to make a fire. He was told that it was important he 
attended, as he was in danger, but that it was possible for him to avert disaster. The next 
day he went to the village, where he was met by Blouin. Blouin gave him a letter from 
Placie, a habitant of Kaskaskia. Placie learned that Piernas was coming bearing orders to 
put him in irons and send him to New Orleans.146  
Blouin explained that he had a way to help Debruisseau. Debruisseau would write a 
note saying he had not yet paid Blouin for the animals, even though he had. Blouin would 
then go to St. Louis and get St. Ange or Labuxière to issue a statement that DeBruisseau 
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must pay him or return the cattle. Blouin would sell the animals and give Debruisseau the 
money. Together they drew up the fake notes, and even rubbed dirt on them to make them 
look older. They successfully followed through on their plan. Afterwards, Debruisseau fled 
to Kaskaskia on the east side of the Mississippi, and made his way north to 
Michilimackinac. Blouin, however, never sent Debruisseau any goods or money from the 
ruse, and Debruisseau became desperate as he was on the run without money or goods. 
Realizing that he had been tricked, DeBruisseau returned to St. Louis to settle his accounts. 
He presented letters as evidence of the trickery, which Blouin had told him to burn. 
However, the letters did not include Blouin’s signature, who by then had returned to the 
east side of the river.147 
 Debruisseau’s case is important because two different authorities investigated it, St. 
Ange and Labuxière began the investigation, and then it was handed off to Piernas. The 
case also shows how French inhabitants from both Upper Louisiana and the Illinois 
Country used the Mississippi to avoid prosecution in either jurisdiction. The case highlights 
how Debruisseau felt he could trust a fellow Frenchman from across the river rather than 
face justice from the arriving Spanish Lieutenant-Governor. Blouin tricked Debruisseau in 
the end, while avoiding prosecution by remaining across the river in a neighbouring 
jurisdiction. This investigation highlights the complicated relations that now existed 
between French inhabitants from both sides of the Mississippi, who had previously all lived 
under the same regime, but were now separated by an imperial border. By returning to St. 
Louis, Debruisseau signalled that he was so desperate and needed to return and take his 
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chances, but it also showed how loyalties in the region had changed. Realizing that Blouin 
had tricked him and left him destitute, but knowing he was innocent, he return and hope 
for leniency and being taken in as a Spanish subject. 
 An incident in 1772 involving Jean- Marie Ducharme also highlights the shifting 
loyalties and priorities of the French inhabitants in Upper Louisiana. While Piernas was 
more competent than Ríu, he still had to learn to manage the relationships with the region’s 
Indigenous groups.148 However, Piernas could be an hard man to work with, and at times 
very heavy handed.149 In 1772, the Little Osages and their Missouris allies grew tired of 
dealing with Piernas, and turned their attention towards attracting the British traders from 
the east, who were more than willing to encroach on Spanish territory. Piernas in turn, with 
Governor Unzaga’s approval, embargoed any trade with the Little Osages and Missouris 
“until they gave evidence of peacefulness and submission.”150 Piernas’ declaration lasted 
until the following winter. Then, an alert was raised that Jean-Marie Ducharme, a French 
trader from the Great Lakes region operating on a British license, had slipped past the 
Spanish fort on the Missouri, and was trading with the Little Osages and the Missouris.151 A 
call to arms was raised, and a militia of volunteer French inhabitants set out to stop him. 
Those who joined the expedition were to be payed from Ducharme’s confiscated furs. The 
founder of St. Louis, Pierre Laclède, was given command of the volunteers. The militia 
managed to surprise Ducharme’s group, and captured his furs and crew. Ducharme himself 
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managed to escape. The show of force by the French volunteers surprised the Little Osages 
and Missouris, who apologized for the indiscretion, and promised to remain peaceful.152 
Such promises were commonplace however, as the Osages were powerful and often acted 
in their own interests as an empire.153 
While the efforts of the militia from St. Louis showed the lengths to which they went 
to protect the security of their trade routes, it also showed how commercial and local 
interests grew in importance compared to older cultural connections. While Ducharme 
operated under a British license, he was ethnically a French Canadian. His cultural 
background seemed not to matter and the expedition was formed as vigorously as if 
Ducharme had been of British stock.154 The incident also showed the ways in which the 
Spanish hierarchy had adapted to local intricacies. Laclède’s appointment to lead the 
expedition gave local credibility to achieving the Spanish goals of influencing the Little 
Osages and the Missouris, and securing the region from British incursions, as Laclède had 
traded with the Osages for years.   
While Ducharme’s excursion provides an interesting case of the growing importance 
of local economic interests versus cultural affinity, it is hard to point to these instances as 
being the rule. It was still quite common for French traders from the east side of the 
Mississippi to cross over to the west side of the river. The lone Spanish fort at the mouth of 
the Missouri could not have managed to stop all of the small groups of traders without a 
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Spanish license. Connections and movement of French traders and families from Louisiana 
to the Illinois country and Canada continued through this period and beyond, and these 
connections were later cultivated to increase the economic scope of the Louisiana fur 
trade.155  
 The strong leadership of Louis Groston de Saint-Ange de Bellerive and François 
Vallé kept order and peace in Upper Louisiana, and at the same time allowed the local 
French inhabitants to peacefully resist the uninformed and inappropriate decisions of 
imperial Spanish leaders. The rebellion in New Orleans, along with the reaction of the local 
French inhabitants in Upper Louisiana helped new Spanish leadership to form more 
effective and locally inspired policies.156 Spanish officials put a lot of effort into reassuring 
the locals that positive change would occur, and partly achieved that commitment by 
maintaining and promoting local French leaders, such as Vallé and St. Ange. The 
increasingly effective Spanish leadership created opportunities for the local French 
inhabitants to continue to accept St. Ange and Vallé as legitimate leaders. Local legal and 
economic interests began to trump some of the cultural ties that existed across the imperial 
boundary of the Mississippi River. While some of these changes may not have been the 
actual trend, it does point how much the French inhabitants were willing to bend under 
shifting imperial landscapes. The Mississippi River border may have been somewhat 
porous and they could not prosecute all who crossed the river without a license, but there 
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were limits as to what they were willing to accept. Capturing Ducharme’s men and making 
an example of them was a way to show where the line was set, what they would and would 
not allow, irrespective of ethnicity. 
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Chapter 3: Rapprochement: Unwritten Norms and the Battle of St. Louis 
The Spanish takeover of Louisiana in the late 1760s was marked by turbulent 
unrest, culminating in the Louisiana Rebellion of 1768 in New Orleans. The early 1770s, 
however, marked a shift towards mending relations between the French inhabitants of 
Upper Louisiana and the Spanish colonial government. Spanish leaders made a greater 
effort to follow local conventions. This compromise, along with the incorporation of leading 
French figures into official positions of power, led to greater cooperation and less hostility. 
During the second half of the 1770s, French inhabitants of St. Louis moved towards more 
amicable relations with Spain. This was in stark contrast to the east side of the Mississippi, 
where tensions between the British Crown and the Thirteen Colonies had turned into a 
revolution, and threatened to spill over into the Illinois Country.157 The French inhabitants 
on the east side of the river, who had lived in relative peace with the British as compared to 
the west side French with the Spanish, were suddenly forced to deal with American 
conquests, most notably George Rogers Clark’s capture of Kaskaskia and Vincennes in 1778 
and 1779, respectively.158 
The death of Louis Groston St. Ange de Bellerive in 1774 marked a turning point in 
which French inhabitants no longer played major roles in the government structure of 
Upper Louisiana. The government, however, still maintained French traditions and laws. As 
Stuart Bannon argues, legal proceedings in St. Louis happened “with little formality, with 
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barely any reference to written law, and with almost no resort to any authority beyond the 
articulated norms of the community.”159 The Spanish governors agreed to maintain legal 
conventions. They saw this as a worthy compromise, as many French legal traditions 
closely resembled contemporary Spanish laws.160 This gesture in turn gave the French 
population a continued sense of power in the direction of the colony, even as leading 
French figures were phased out of the government structure after the death of St. Ange. 
As conflict between the Spanish officials and French inhabitants began to subside, 
the region experienced increased economic activity and growth.  Minor internal friction 
between French inhabitants existed, but it mainly centered around economic disputes. 
Spanish and French officials were more concerned about maintaining the delicate peace in 
the region. As the lack of internal colonial conflict continued, in 1780, both the French 
inhabitants and Spanish officials eventually pushed for outright cooperation. As the 
American revolution spilled over to the west side of the Mississippi, the Spanish colonial 
government and French inhabitants fostered a successful partnership in preparing the 
defence of St. Louis in the face of a British invasion.161 While French inhabitants were 
initially wary of taking direct military orders from the Lieutenant-Governor, both sides 
eventually put distrust aside and collectively built fortifications and formed militias for the 
colony’s defence. The French and Spanish were forced cooperate, but in many ways the 
defence of St. Louis crystallized the rapprochement that had been occurring since the end 
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of the rebellion in 1769.162 This rapprochement was so successful, that the Spanish 
eventually had the confidence to appoint Zénon Trudeau, a local French Creole, as 
Lieutenant-Governor in 1792. 
The period between 1775 and 1780 is notable for its relative lack of official 
correspondence pertaining to discontent and social unrest between the Spanish and French 
inhabitants. This marked a major turning point in the colonial relations at St. Louis. The 
lack of internal colonial conflict ushered in a period of significant growth in the colony and 
the creation of a large body of documents concerning trade, property, and labour disputes. 
As the settlement matured and economic activity increased, the attention of both the 
imperial government and the local inhabitants turned away from battles over imperial 
policies and local conventions. Both the Spanish government officials and French 
inhabitants worked together to end the conflicts for the greater good and peace of the 
colony. 
The legal framework of Upper Louisiana existed at an intersection of written 
Franco-Spanish law and local traditions. Banner notes that written laws and rules were 
regularly trumped by unwritten norms.163 While Spanish codes enacted in Spain or New 
Orleans theoretically governed the towns of Upper Louisiana, they had almost no real 
effect. The Spanish codes were rarely referenced in any of the surviving legal 
documentation, and the French Code Noir (Slave Legal Code) was also consulted very 
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infrequently and laxly enforced.164 Familiarity with local customs was of a much greater 
importance for the Lieutenant-Governor and other Spanish officials, than knowledge of 
formal law.165 Bannon notes that “cases were decided according to an intuitive sense of 
justice shared by the majority of the community.”166 Law in Upper Louisiana was therefore 
formulated through the everyday routines of the local French inhabitants, rather than 
created and imposed on them by Spanish officials. The French inhabitants ensured these 
cultural norms influenced the Lieutenant-Governors’ decisions, and the Lieutenant-
Governors accepted these unwritten norms as law to help keep peace in the region. 
In March of 1779, the Lieutenant-Governor De Leyba presided over a land dispute 
between two neighbours in St. Louis. Silvestre Labadie accused Alexis Marié of encroaching 
on his property, and tearing out his fruit trees. The property line had recently been 
redrawn and part of the land that Marié thought he had bought from the previous owner 
now belonged to Labadie. Labadie attested that Marié had torn out the trees even after the 
new dividing fence had been planted out of spite.167 Marié responded to the accusation that 
he had believed the land was his as the previous owners of Labadie’s land had never 
pursued a claim. He had agreed to redraw the property line either way. He testified that he 
removed the trees prior to the new fence being put up, and that Labadie had in fact asked 
him to remove the trees.168 Depositions from Jean Marie Peppin dit Lachance, the previous 
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owner of Labadie’s land, backed up Marié’s claim that he had never sought ownership of 
the land in question.169 While testimony from Louis Chandelier corroborated Marié’s story 
that Labadie had said that the trees “are not good for anything, and you [Marié] can keep 
them and do whatever you want with them.”170 
Ultimately, De Leyba concluded that Labadie’s accusations against Marie were 
unfounded and “there was no basis for a trial between the two parties.”171 De Leyba found 
the depositions of Lachance and Chandelier to be credible, and that Labadie’s request “only 
comes from a spirit of chicanery and stubbornness, contrary to the union which should rule 
between neighbors.”172 De Leyba condemned Labadie to cover the expenses of the trial for 
wasting the court’s time.173 De Leyba based his decision on an unwritten norm in Upper 
Louisiana. The rule between neighbours was not a written law laid out in any code, but 
rather an ideal or convention agreed upon within the community to compromise and be 
amiable in dealing with others. That De Leyba used this as the basis of his ruling shows 
how Spanish officials were using unwritten norms of the community to help interpret and 
adjudicate law in the colony, and that the French inhabitants accepted rulings based on 
these conventions.  
Further evidence of local customs holding precedence, and a decline in conflict 
between the French inhabitants and Spanish officials occurred in December 1778, when 
Louis Mahas, an Indigenous trader of the Maha nation, returned to St. Louis. Louis Mahas 
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was a former slave from Canada, who having been sold to an English master east of the 
Mississippi, killed his master and escaped to the west side of the Mississippi.174 Mahas 
semi-regularly visited St. Louis, and had a penchant for causing trouble.175 Joseph 
Labuxière, Silvestre Labadie, and François Bonrozier brought a petition on behalf of the 
other inhabitants of St. Louis to De Leyba, and asked that Mahas be banished from the 
settlement forever. The petition accused Mahas “as a trouble maker of the public peace and 
having already committed there several disorders and evil spells and armed robberies in 
addition to the fear of other greater unfortunate happenings that could result.”176 The 
petition also stated that Mahas was guilty of “robbery, debauching slaves with drink, 
insulting inhabitants, and having even wanted to kill with a gun and taking to all sorts of 
violence and excesses until threatening that he wanted to scalp Spanish and French 
heads.”177 De Leyba responded that in accordance with protocol, he would need 
“attestations of persons worthy of faith, residing in this.”178 Noel Langlois, a trader, Joseph 
Mainville Dechesnes, a farmer, Angel Ixquierdo, a member of the Spanish garrison, and 
François Villet St. Cloux, a hunter, provided testimony and the resulting trial explored the 
many affronts that Mahas had made to the inhabitants of St. Louis.179 
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When Mahas had first wandered into St. Louis unannounced in 1775, he had shot a 
cow that belonged to Joseph Mainville Dechesnes, narrowly missing a black slave woman 
standing behind it.180 When Mahas was asked to explain his actions, he merely stated that 
he had done it for his own pleasure. Lieutenant-Governor Piernas ordered Mahas to pay 
reparations to Dechesnes. Mahas did not have the necessary funds and he fled St. Louis 
soon thereafter without paying.181 With Mahas’ return, Dechesnes had another chance to 
sue for reparations, and gave official testimony about the incident to De Leyba. Mahas’ 
infamy grew when Angel Ixquierdo, a Spanish garrison soldier, testified that in December 
1777, Mahas had attacked him unprovoked with a tomahawk. Ixquierdo managed to parry 
the attack with a stick and subdued Mahas. Mahas then apologized for his action and “he 
went away without saying anything else.”182 
The final straw for the inhabitants of St. Louis came when Mahas accosted some 
French hunters near the Illinois River in early December 1778. Mahas grabbed the rifle 
belonging to St. Cloux, and announced that he wished to kill some Frenchmen, and then 
fired a shot at St. Cloux, which missed.183 The hunters managed to subdue Mahas and 
brought him back to St. Louis, where St. Cloux confined him to his attic.184 After this, Mahas 
was brought before De Leyba to hear his fate. De Leyba found the testimonies in the case to 
be credible, and “having consideration to the just request of the plaintiffs as much for 
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public tranquility as for the security of the citizens. We have ordered and do order that the 
said Louis Mahas, savage, will be expulsed from this post for always and remitted to the 
capital of Louisiana to the disposition of Monsieur the Governor General of the Colony.”185 
In the end, Mahas escaped from custody and was never recaptured or sent to New 
Orleans. He had cut his irons with a file, and escaped through a fracture in the wall made 
below the level of the earth.186 The Mahas case represents a shift away from internal strife 
and politics within the settlement of St. Louis. Mahas was an outsider who disrupted life in 
the settlement, and so it was in the interest of both the inhabitants and the Spanish colonial 
officials to find a mutual solution. The amount of correspondence and testimony devoted to 
his case shows the importance French inhabitants and the Spanish attributed to it. Both 
sides saw the necessity to keep order in the settlement, an acknowledgement of a fragile 
peace.  
The relative peace achieved in the settlement of St. Louis allowed economic activity 
to prosper, which led to the growth of the population. The growth of the settlement saw an 
increase in commercial competition, which in turn led to more trade and financial disputes. 
One such dispute arose on January 11, 1779 between Claude Tinon and Jean-Baptiste 
Meynard, two farmers from Prairie du Catalan near St. Louis. The case highlights how the 
inhabitants’ economic activities were intertwined. Tinon rented land to Meynard, who then 
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hired Tinon to work the land for him. In the meantime, Meynard had supposedly also hired 
Tinon to do some carpentry work on his house.  
Tinon pled in a petition to Lieutenant-Governor De Leyba that he had rented 
Meynard a piece of land, had provided nine days’ worth of man hours doing carpentry, and 
ploughing, for which he had never been paid.187 Tinon testified that not only had Meynard 
not compensated him, but that “Meynard takes away his effects little by little to the other 
side of the river [the east side of the Mississippi, under English jurisdiction] and that he has 
only a little wheat left in his barn and two pigs which he could take away, the whole thing 
without paying the plaintiff.”188 Tinon asked for reparations, and for the remainder of 
Meynard’s goods on the west side of the Mississippi be seized until the matter was settled. 
That a French inhabitant of Upper Louisiana trusted the Spanish Lieutenant-Governor to 
adjudicate a conflict with another French inhabitant shows how far relations between the 
French and Spanish had improved. The French inhabitants successful push to provide input 
and participation in the colonial government allowed them to be more confident in the 
process of colonial justice, even if none of the officials involved were French. The French 
did not stay outside the affairs of colonial governance, but rather forced their influence 
onto the governing process. 
Because Meynard tried to avoid repaying his debt by staying on the east side of the 
Mississippi, he could not immediately dispute Tinon’s claim. De Leyba issued an order the 
following day for Labuxière to seize the remaining goods and place them under the 
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guardianship of Clement Delor de Treget, the founder of Prairie du Catalan. In Labuxière’s 
report cataloguing Jean-Baptiste Meynard’s remaining goods, he found three bushels of 
beaten wheat and two large pigs. In a slight twist of events, Delor refused to be guardian of 
the goods, as he did not wish to become entangled in what looked to be a drawn-out 
affair.189 In a bizarre move, perhaps out of necessity, Labuxière decided to name Louis 
Meynard, Jean-Baptiste’s son, as guardian of the goods until the dispute was settled.190 
Labuxière’s decision to rely on the son of the accused to hold the goods is odd, as Louis 
Meynard would most likely have been sympathetic to his father, and could have hidden or 
used the goods on his behalf. Louis later testified on his father’s behalf. 
 As news of the seizure of his goods reached Jean-Baptiste Meynard on the east side 
of the river, he sent a letter to De Leyba to dispute Tinon’s claim. Meynard claimed that 
while he had rented land from Tinon, this debt had been settled, and all Tinon’s other 
claims were false. He asked for Tinon to be charged for rendering a false petition, and that 
his property be returned.191 In response, Lieutenant-Governor De Leyba ordered that the 
issue be examined further, and that both sides would present witnesses to corroborate 
their story.192 On January 18, 1779, Louis Meynard testified on behalf of his father’s case in 
front of Lieutenant-Governor De Leyba, the garrison commander Diego Blanco, and 
Labuxière the notary. Louis testified that his father had indeed asked to rent some land 
from Tinon and had Tinon him to work it for him, but they had not agreed on a rental price. 
As well, he testified that his father knew of Tinon’s work on the land, however, he disputed 
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the amount of time it had taken Tinon to accomplish it. Louis also testified that it was Tinon 
who had taken advantage of the Meynards, as Tinon had taken a pair of iron door supports 
which did not belong to him. Meynard had offered Tinon ninety-seven livres of flour and a 
six-month old sow for his rent and work. Tinon did not accept them.193 Delor in turn 
testified on behalf of Tinon’s case, sticking to an earlier promise to try to remain outside of 
the dispute, he merely confirmed that Tinon had indeed done some carpentry work in 
Meynard’s house, and that he believed that the iron door supports were owed to Tinon for 
a previous job.194 
Having heard testimony on both sides, De Leyba came to decision which seems to 
have made neither side happy. De Leyba found that Meynard had not paid a fair amount for 
the rental of Tinon’s land, and ordered him to pay a further fifty and a half livres of flour to 
Tinon. De Leyba, however, found that Tinon lacked sufficient proof for the rest of his 
claims, and therefore Meynard’s goods, including the iron door supports were to be 
returned to him. Tinon was sentenced to pay for all the costs and expenses of the trial. The 
only further restriction put on Jean-Baptiste Meynard, was that he was banned from 
travelling to the east side of the Mississippi.  
The Tinon-Meynard case represents and interesting intersection of evidence 
regarding economic activity in and around St. Louis, the continued migration of French 
people back and forth across the Mississippi to the Illinois country, as well as the limits of 
imperial power concerning such boundaries. The fact that Tinon had acquired more 
suitable farmland than he could farm himself shows the growth of St. Louis in an 
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agriculture sense. This is especially impressive considering that in the first decade of its 
existence the town was known by the nickname of Paincourt, literally translating as short 
of bread.195 That Jean-Baptiste Meynard continued crossing of the Mississippi highlights 
the familial and trade links between French communities on either side of the river that 
endured even after being separated by imperial borders.196 The fact that De Leyba would 
need to state that Meynard was restricted from crossing showed how Spanish imperial 
officials were still concerned about such crossings, but also shows the futility of this kind of 
decree, as there was really no way to enforce or patrol such restrictions.197 
Another such dispute occurred a month later involving claims of illegal trade on the 
Kansas River. On February 20, 1779, Joseph Labuxière, the notary, put forward a petition to 
De Leyba about illegal trade. Labuxière and a trader named Vivarenne jointly held a permit 
to trade at the post of the Kans. Labuxière had been informed by Jean-Marie Cardinal, a 
“trader with the Little Osage, that the named Louis Beaudouin to whom you have 
graciously accorded a permit to hunt down the Missouri had, against your orders, entered 
the river of the Kans [Kansas].”198 Labuxière went on to name the rest of Beaudouin’s 
group, which included “the named Valée, Joseph LeProvencal, the named St. Michel, Giles 
Langlais and the named Varoquier.”199 Labuxière ended his petition by informing 
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Lieutenant-Governor De Leyba that Beaudouin would be arriving in St. Louis shortly, and 
asked that he be punished for having “violated the orders that you have so wisely made 
known to all the hunters and traders of the Missouri River.”200 
In response to the allegations, De Leyba ordered that all Beaudouin’s goods be 
temporarily confiscated and would be placed in the hands of Marie-Therese Chouteau, the 
wife of Pierre Laclède, and the mother of Auguste Chouteau.201 Having stated that the facts 
of the case would be examined, De Leyba ordered that Cardinal, the trader who originally 
informed Labuxière of Beaudouin’s transgressions, would have to testify in person as to the 
validity of the petition. Two days later, on February 22, 1779, Cardinal appeared before De 
Leyba and Diego Blanco, the Captain of the garrison, and testified that he learned that 
Beaudouin had been trading on the Kansas river when Beaudouin had returned to the 
Missouri post with seven packets of buckskins. He testified that that he knew of Lieutenant-
Governor’s orders concerning permits, and felt it was his duty to inform Labuxière of the 
transgression on his permitted area.202 Next, De Leyba interrogated Michel Provencal, an 
engagé (fur trader working under as an indentured servant) attached to Joseph St. Michel, 
another trader working on the Kansas River. Provencal testified that he had seen 
Beaudouin and his group trading on the Kansas, and was told by Beaudouin’s engagé, Valée, 
that they had traded for the quantity of six hundred livres of skins. Provencal also testified 
that it was he who had first brought the matter to the attention of the trader Cardinal.203 
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Finally, De Leyba mandated that Louis Beaudouin himself would have to answer for 
the allegations of his transgressions on the Kansas River. Beaudouin testified that he had 
initially set out to only hunt and buy slaves in the region of the Kansas River, however his 
group was set upon by a group of Indigenous people who demanded that they trade with 
them. Beaudoin testified that the Indigenous group threatened to take the goods by force if 
they did not trade with them. When questioned about the previous testimony implicating 
him having been trading under his own freewill, he could not find an appropriate 
answer.204 De Leyba also questioned him as to his practice of purchasing Indigenous slaves, 
as this was also illegal, to which again Beaudouin had no practical answer.205 Finding 
Beaudouin’s answers to be unjustifiable, De Leyba ordered that all Beaudouin’s furs were 
to be confiscated, with a third of the pelts going to the crown as a tax, and the rest split 
amongst the traders who held valid trade permits on the Kansas River. In addition, 
Beaudouin was sentenced to fifteen days in prison and required to cover all the costs of the 
trial.206 
 The Kansas River trade dispute between Labuxière and Beaudouin highlights how 
French merchants, traders, and hunters were more concerned with economic activities and 
jurisdictions, rather than focusing on imperial matters. More importantly, however, the 
case shows that French traders began relying on the rule of law and judgements of Spanish 
administered courts. The French inhabitants turned to these previously unwelcome 
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imperial agents to regulate trade and to settle disputes. This contrasted with earlier 
imperial/colonial relations when the French often took such matters into their own hands 
and did not trust Spanish officials. This change also highlights how the Spanish had 
managed to establish some sort of imperial power over the colony. Importantly though, this 
was only possible because the French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana allowed it. The 
French inhabitants gave the Spanish the opportunity to have their regulations and 
decisions carry any judicial weight. Had the French inhabitants still not trusted the Spanish 
courts, they could have avoided the process altogether, giving the Spanish officials no cases 
up which to adjudicate. 
After the death of St. Ange in 1774, only Spanish officers remained in positions of 
real power within Upper Louisiana’s government. While the lack of any French 
governmental figures brought about minor changes to how the structure and legal 
processes of the region functioned, the French legal institutions and ancient laws which 
were originally brought to region continued to be respected and followed under Spanish 
rule. This was especially true with the continuation of the Coutume de Paris, and how this 
traditional set of laws governed marriage contracts and disputes. The Coutume de Paris was 
a set of legal codes created in 1507, to govern family, inheritance, property, and debt 
recovery in early modern France. The code was first applied to Paris and the surrounding 
region, and then later applied to all French overseas colonies, including New France and 
Louisiana. Under the Coutume de Paris, property brought into a communauté des biens (a 
community of good through marriage) by either spouse, remained their personal property, 
while any further property gained during the marriage was jointly owned by both 
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parties.207 This stipulation played an important role in how separations, inheritance, and 
especially douaires (dowries), funds set aside from the children’s inheritance from the 
father of a marriage community for a wife in the event of a husband’s death, were dealt 
with. These customs remained an important part of the day to day lives of the French 
inhabitants in Louisiana throughout the Spanish regime.208 
Carl Ekberg provides an excellent discussion of how the Coutume de Paris continued 
in the early years of Spanish rule in Upper Louisiana, and how this represented a 
continuation of French culture under a new imperial regime. Ekberg’s study, however, 
looks at the founding of St. Louis until the death of St. Ange in 1775, not whether the 
Coutume de Paris continued after St. Ange’s imposing presence had disappeared and the 
French inhabitants began to work more closely with Spanish officials.209  
In the summer of 1779, widow Barbe Villecompte brought forward accusations 
against Louis Dubreuil for forgoing debt responsibilities. The widow Villecompte argued 
that upon Dubreuil’s arrival in St. Louis a year earlier, he had signed a lease with her to live 
on her property for three years and by which he:  
committed himself to maintain the house, fences, and outbuildings, 
[making] all the necessary repairs, and to remit to her two hundred livres 
of flour at the end of the said three years as a rental charge. In addition, 
[he committed] to take care of the cattle, to return them to her in the same 
state at the end of the said term.210 
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 In only one year, however, Dubreuil had let the house, hay barn, and the fences fall 
into such disrepair that Villecompte felt the property was not suitable for continued 
habitation. Furthermore, she contended that Dubreuil let many of the cattle he was tasked 
with looking after die, and had secretly tried to sell the rest out from under her. As Dubreuil 
himself had no property on which she could lay claim, she asked that all four hundred 
sheaves of wheat he had recently harvested from the land be seized as compensation, that 
he be forced to repair the property, her remaining cattle returned, and that the final two 
years of the lease be forfeited.211 Following an official inspection of said property, 
Lieutenant-Governor De Leyba agreed to all of Villecompte’s demands, except that 273 
livres and six sols worth of the seized wheat would need to be granted to the government 
as payment for service and justice, as Dubreuil had no other property from which to pay for 
the trial.212 
The Widow Villecompte versus Louis Dubreuil proved to be a useful example of how 
the Coutume de Paris continued to have power in post-St. Ange Upper Louisiana. The fact 
that Madame Villecompte could bring the dispute before the Lieutenant-Governor himself, 
showed the status that widows retained following their husbands’ death in governing the 
estate. As well, it is important that as a widow, she still had control of a sizable portion of 
property following her husband’s death. While a copy of the marriage contract was not part 
of the case, her continued prosperity points to fact that the property must have either been 
set aside as part of her douaires or that she herself brought the property into the marriage 
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community, and therefore it wholly remained hers even after her husband’s death. In either 
case, it showed that the basic customs of the Coutume continued to be followed. 213 
Lieutenant-Governor De Leyba needed to be familiar with the debt recovery portion of the 
Coutume, or have access to a French notary or lawyer to evaluate the case and make such a 
decision. 
A further intriguing example of the continuation of French law is seen in the court 
case between Joseph Robidou and the Becquet family in 1780.  Their story in actual fact 
began eight years earlier, in 1772, when Pierre Borgne de St. Belfeu gave testimony in St. 
Louis that Jacques Robidou had murdered his wife. St. Belfeu swore that Jacques Robidou 
had mentioned in detail the troubles he was having at home and his plans to kill his wife. St. 
Belfeu explained to the court that he had taken the initiative and had confiscated the gun 
Robidou was threatening to use for the crime. After leaving Robidou and travelling to the 
nearby town of Grand Calumet, St. Belfeu learned that Jacques Robidou had stabbed his 
wife three times with a knife, and thus had managed to kill her nonetheless.214 While this 
incident seemed to have been settled, it would come to haunt Joseph Robidou, the 
murderer’s nephew. 
In 1780, Joseph Robidou brought forward charges that “he finds himself shamefully 
dishonored in his person and in his family meanly invented by people always ready to 
harm and tarnish the steadiest reputation.”215 Joseph Robidou had been courting the 
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daughter of the local blacksmith, referred to only as Monsieur Becquet. Robidou had 
approached Monsieur Becquet with the intention of asking for her hand in marriage. 
Robidou testified that Becquet seemed pleased by the idea, but asked for three days to 
consider it.  
The trouble arose when after three days, Becquet refused and told Robidou that he 
would not let his daughter marry into a family that had sold their souls to the devil.216 
Apparently, Becquet had learned from his cousin, who had learned from unnamed sources 
that not only had Robidou’s uncle murdered his wife, but he had also killed his boss, 
kidnapped another man’s wife, and fled to the post of Vincennes in the Illinois Country. 
Becquet would not divulge the source, and so Robidou set off on his own to find those who 
were spreading the story, going so far as to travel to Vincennes. In Vincennes, he met a 
former Canadien voyageur named Tabeau who knew Robidou’s family and declared 
Becquet’s story false. This, in Robidou’s eyes, cleared his family of any wrong doing.217 
Robidou returned to St. Louis and confronted the Becquet cousin, who refused to name his 
source. Robidou believed that a junior blacksmith named Marly and a farmer named Robert 
Sr. had made up the story. Robidou asked the Lieutenant-Governor to force the naming of 
the sources, and reprimand them for staining his honour. In response, Marly’s testified he 
was innocence and had had nothing to do with the rumour. However, he also rejected the 
testimony of Tabeau, as he had heard from a priest at Fort de Chartres about the truth of 
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Robidou’s family.218 Having heard the testimony from both sides, De Leyba adjudicated the 
case by forcing both parties to respect a year if silence on the issue: 
Everything duly and attentively examined, and since the attestations 
produced by Robert and Marly cancel out those produced by the said 
Robidou, which prevents us from establishing any certain judgment about 
the truth or falsehood of the facts advanced in the petitions on both sides, 
we have thrown the present parties out of court and out of trial; we impose 
silence upon them on both sides on this subject, under pain of 
punishment.219 
De Leyba gave Robidou one year to find evidence that his family did not commit the 
murder of which they are accused, but “after the year has passed, we reject all requests 
made by the said Robidou toward the said Robert and Marly.”220 De Leyba also made 
Robidou temporarily responsible for the cost of the proceedings, until actual evidence 
could be produced. De Leyba’s insistence on the need for physical evidence to make a 
judgement shows how he followed the necessary codes and conventions, and did not 
simply make decisions based on whims, or his own judgement.   
As evidenced by court documentation of disputes occurring after the death of St. 
Ange in 1775, French laws of the Coutume de Paris, continued to be the code by which local 
familial and mercantile legal issues was governed. The continuation of the Coutume de Paris 
and other unwritten conventions in this period shows how it was important that it was 
Spanish government officials who were adjudicating on issues dealing with French 
customs. This pluralistic legal situation shows great adaption on the part of the Spanish 
government officials to properly interact with the set standards of the French people. 
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The Battle of St. Louis represented another major instance of local French 
inhabitants cooperating with Imperial Spain for the survival of the colony. Spain invested 
little in Upper Louisiana, either in financial resources, or in military aid. Lieutenant-
Governor De Leyba therefore had little choice but to ask local French inhabitants to fund 
the defence of the colony, provide the labour, and then garrison a stone tower at St. Louis. 
This battle represented the beginning of local cross-river diplomacy with the budding 
American republic.221 While Spain did not openly declare war on the British until 1779, 
they had previously allowed their subjects to openly trade with the revolutionaries. It was 
only with the Spanish entry into the war against the British that the French inhabitants and 
Spanish officials in Upper Louisiana saw the need to actively deliberate with the Americans 
in the face of impending British attacks. 
Following the entry of Spain into the American Revolutionary War in 1779, British 
military planners wanted to secure the Mississippi River against both Spanish and 
American activities, assaulting the western American garrison at Kaskaskia, and limit 
Spanish trade to the west. 222 They planned to attack New Orleans from West Florida, as 
well as sending several expeditions from the north to gain control of targets in the Upper 
Mississippi, including the settlement of St. Louis. Bernardo de Gálvez, the Governor of 
Spanish Louisiana, moved quickly to gain control of British outposts on the Lower 
Mississippi, and threatened action against West Florida's principal outposts of Mobile and 
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Pensacola before the British expeditions from West Florida could get off the ground.223 
Patrick Sinclair, the military governor at Fort Michilimackinac at the Straits of Mackinac 
(Mackinaw City, Michigan), organized the British expedition from the north. In February 
1780, Sinclair began recruiting allied Indigenous peoples for an expedition against St. 
Louis. British fur traders were offered the control the fur trade in the upper parts of 
Spanish Louisiana as an incentive to help with recruitment and join the expedition. Most of 
the British force gathered at Prairie du Chien, near the confluence of the Wisconsin and 
Mississippi Rivers, where they were placed under the command of Emanuel Hesse, a 
former militia Captain turned fur trader. The force was eventually made up of about two 
dozen fur traders and an estimated 750 to 1,000 Natives when it embarked south from 
Prairie du Chien on May 2.224 
At the time of the expedition, Fernando de Leyba was the Lieutenant-Governor of 
Upper Louisiana. A fur trader warned De Leyba ahead of time of the approaching British 
force. In preparation for hostilities with the British force, De Leyba organized the building 
of the first road between St. Genevieve and St. Louis. This road would allow for swifter 
reinforcement of either settlement, year-round reliable communication between the two 
settlements, and it would limit the prospect of pirogues (large dugout canoe-like barges) 
being attacked from the east bank.225  
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The Spanish had woefully under-garrisoned St. Louis since their arrival. De Leyba 
had only 29 regular soldiers and a disorganized militia made up of 168 local French 
inhabitants. In response to the impending crisis, De Leyba worked to build a proper 
defence of the town.226 With imperial funds scarce, De Leyba begged local French 
inhabitants to contribute to building proper fortifications for city. This was no easy task, as 
De Leyba’s tenure to this point had seen a return of tensions between himself and the local 
merchants. De Leyba had arrived to a shortage of imperial goods to be used as gifts for 
Indigenous parties visiting St. Louis. In response to the crisis, De Leyba demanded that the 
merchants give him the necessary goods, and the merchants resented what they saw as 
imperial meddling in trade and hurting their bottom line.227 Even with these on-going 
tensions, the local inhabitants saw the outside threat as more important, and personal 
funds were collected, including from De Leyba himself. A single thirty-foot stone tower was 
constructed and ringed by cannons and trenches dug around the settlement. The British-
Indigenous attack on St. Louis was repelled, and many of the Natives abandoned the assault 
after the first volley from the city’s cannons. The rest of the attacking force were kept from 
reaching the fortifications, and so resorted to burning crops and looting farmland.228 While 
the battle itself lasted only a short time, the resultant cooperation between the Spanish 
colonial officials and the French inhabitants marked another milestone. Even the French 
inhabitants did not personal like De Leyba, the two sides had banded together in the face of 
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an external threat to the region. The British attack on St. Louis saw the return of Jean-Marie 
Ducharme seeking revenge for the punishment he had suffered in 1772 for illegally trading 
on the Missouri River. While he did not directly join in the Battle of St. Louis, he led the 
British attack across the river on the Americans at Cahokia, which also failed.229 His failed 
return showed once again that not all French were on the same side because of their 
cultural or ethnic ties. 
The battle also had a large influence on future inter-imperial relations in Louisiana. 
The other British force sent to attack Cahokia on the east side of the river had also failed, 
and marked the end of British imperial aspirations in Illinois Country. The British still 
maintained navigation rights and some fur trade presence in the very upper reaches of the 
Mississippi watershed, but were no longer a threat to Spanish Louisiana.230  This left the 
Spanish government, and the local French inhabitants with the now permanent job of 
dealing with the Americans. While the Americans would not immediately invade across the 
Mississippi, they still represented a new challenge that the Spanish and French groups 
could agree upon. The ever-growing western advance of American settlers threatened 
Spain just as much as the British presence had, and incursions of Anglo-American fur 
traders remained a menace to economic activity and Indigenous relations.231 Spain’s 
victory over the British was a great achievement for the under supplied region, and De 
Leyba’s efforts at organizing a defence were rewarded with a promotion to the military 
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to go along with his role as Lieutenant-Governor.232 
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Many of the French inhabitants of St. Louis had a personal dislike of De Leyba. De 
Leyba had provided some dodgy debt guarantees to the American forces across the river. 
The Americans then used this credit to buy goods from some traders from St. Louis. When 
time came for the debt to be repaid, the Americans defaulted and some Upper Louisianans, 
including De Leyba, were left poverty-stricken.233  While many French inhabitants had a 
personal dislike for De Leyba, it does not mean that the French Inhabitants were not willing 
to cooperate with the Spanish in the defence of the settlement. The French inhabitants 
organized into a militia at De Leyba’s request. The French inhabitants helped to fund and 
build the new tower and fortifications for the town. The militia from St. Genevieve made up 
of French inhabitants came to defend St. Louis at De Leyba’s request, and ultimately De 
Leyba’s leadership was a key to successfully repelling the attack. The only eyewitness 
source of the battle, other than De Leyba’s official report, was a letter written under the 
pseudonym ‘Amicus’ by a French inhabitant of St. Louis that provides a scathing rebuke of 
De Leyba’s character. Amicus clearly did not personally like De Leyba, and his account of 
the battle was most likely coloured by this contempt. While Amicus blames De Leyba for 
the disorganized defence of the settlement, his account does not deny the fact that the 
defence was successful, nor that the French inhabitants cooperated in the defence of the 
settlement.234 The French inhabitants did not need to personally like the Lieutenant-
Governor to shift into a period of rapprochement with the Spanish colonial governing 
system. 
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While the Battle of St. Louis ended up being a minor skirmish in the American 
Revolution, the effect it had for the local French population in Upper Louisiana was 
enormous. The imminent threat had meant that the French inhabitants had to cooperate 
with and trust a Spanish Lieutenant-Governor more closely than anytime previously. While 
tensions between the two sides had lessened since the threat of rebellion in the late 1760s, 
this change marked an even greater shift towards acceptance of common goals and 
cooperation. The results of the battle also greatly changed the international landscape in 
the region. With the British threat of invasion gone, the French in Upper Louisiana accepted 
American rule of Illinois Country, but also had to be wary of what American presence 
would mean for the security of their towns and trade. While the Spanish crown had always 
seemed disinterested in the local events of the region, their recognition of De Leyba’s 
efforts perhaps signaled a shift in perception. De Leyba’s defense of the region earned him 
a royal commission from the King of Spain, promoting him from Captain to Lieutenant-
Colonel.235 The correspondence between the royal court in Madrid and Governor Gálvez 
spoke highly of the importance of victory at St. Louis and hoped the region would continue 
to serve as a buffer between British/American expansion and Spanish colonies to the 
southwest. 
The late 1770s saw greater cooperation between the French and Spanish in Upper 
Louisiana. The continuation of French legal conventions under the Spanish regime 
signalled the acceptance of local customs as necessary for colonial peace and prosperity. 
Fewer internal disputes between the French Inhabitants and Spanish officials saw the rise 
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of further conflict with outside sources, and between French individuals. Imperial conflicts, 
and in particular the American Revolution   culminated in the Battle of St. Louis in 1780, 
which saw both the French inhabitants and Spanish officials cooperate in the face of a large 
British threat. With Spanish/French victory assured, future British incursions were 
virtually eliminated, but in their place emerged the spectre of a more imposing and 
unpredictable American republic.  
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Conclusion 
The granting of Louisiana to Spain in 1762 saw the French inhabitants of the region 
come face the face with the reality of being ruled by a foreign monarch. The French crown 
had decided to abandon the land and people in the hopes of consolidating their power in 
the Caribbean and looking for gains in Europe. St. Louis was founded after the official 
imperial turnover in 1763, but the change did not affect the day to day lives of the local 
people until the arrival of Spanish officials and soldiers in 1766.236 Spanish imperial agents 
brought new laws and expectations with them, which eventually forced both sides to 
confront their different ideas about how the region should be governed – increased colonial 
oversight, or the more laissez-faire status quo. Both the French inhabitants’ and Spanish 
ideas about the region needed to deal with Choquette’s argument about centres and 
periphery. St. Louis was on the edge of the Spanish empire and wished to be left to its own 
devices, while still maintaining concerns about the lack of imperial support. However, the 
French inhabitants also had to contend with the fact that St. Louis itself was a centre, with a 
network of trading and Indigenous relations on its periphery.237 
The Spanish arrived in Upper Louisiana unprepared to handle the local intricacies of 
the region. The first Spanish official in Upper Louisiana, Ríu, was an incompetent leader. He 
blindly introduced restrictive trade policies as per the Governor’s orders, and did not fully 
understand the importance of maintaining good relations with Indigenous peoples. Ríu also 
failed to adequately address the encroachment of British traders from the east side of the 
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Mississippi River. The French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana resisted restrictive trade 
policies using community backed petitions. After the initial period of resistance, the French 
inhabitants of Upper Louisiana decided that rather than remaining outside the Spanish 
colonial governance and governing structures, they would infiltrate it instead. Leading 
French inhabitants were given positions of power in the new administration as the Spanish 
adjusted to the aftereffects of the Louisiana Rebellion of 1768. The French leaders were 
able to advise and influence on local matters and conventions, all while the Spanish officials 
officially remained in control. Through this period of infiltration, the French inhabitants of 
upper Louisiana influenced the system of government in the region. The French impact on 
Spanish governance during these intervening years (1770-1775) meant that when French 
leaders eventually gave way to Spanish officials, local French conventions had become 
firmly entrenched in Spanish governance of Upper Louisiana. Spanish officials adjudicated 
legal cases using French cultural pillars such as the Coutume de Paris and unwritten local 
norms. The French inhabitants had reached a rapprochement with the Spanish colonial 
officials, culminating in full on cooperation during the Battle of St. Louis.  
The French inhabitants of other former French colonies in North America saw their 
political and economic elite leave when faced with a new imperial ruler, the opposite was 
true for Spanish Upper Louisiana.238 Most of the former colonial bureaucrats and military 
elite of the Illinois country migrated to Upper Louisiana after the Illinois Country had been 
transferred to the British in 1763. The ensuing infiltration of the Spanish colonial system in 
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Upper Louisiana allowed the French inhabitants to protect and strengthen their local 
conventions and institutions. 
The people of Upper Louisiana experienced changes in imperial governance three 
more times by the end of 1803. In 1793, Zenon Trudeau, a French creole, was appointed as 
Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Louisiana.239 While still nominally under Spanish rule, the 
appointment of Trudeau saw a French leader back in charge of the region for the first time 
since St. Ange was handed power over to Pedro Piernas in 1768. Trudeau’s appointment 
marked the culmination of the French inhabitants’ efforts to protect their culture and 
influence policy under the Spanish regime. 
In late 1800, the Treaty of San Ildefonso was signed between Spain and France.240 
The treaty returned Louisiana to France, something that many of the French inhabitants of 
Louisiana had hoped for since 1762. And yet the France that had first given up Louisiana no 
longer existed. While going about their lives on the edge of a foreign empire, France’s 
Ancien Régime had been overthrown, replaced by a short-lived republic, which eventually 
gave way to the authoritarian regime of Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon dreamed of 
rebuilding New France in Louisiana. By late 1803, when the treaty to return Louisiana to 
France became public, war with Great Britain was on the horizon. An unacceptable amount 
of resources would be needed to protect the shipping lanes between France and Louisiana. 
Napoleonic France was also dealing with a slave revolt in Saint-Domingue. In 1802, 
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Napoleon sent 20,000 troops to put down the revolt. This counter-revolution was 
unsuccessful, as many of the soldiers had succumbed to yellow fever. The loss of Haiti made 
Louisiana strategically untenable, and so once again, France abandoned Louisiana to a 
foreign power. The transfer of Louisiana in 1803 to the United States of America was yet 
another regime change, and the French people of Louisiana found themselves yet again in 
the position of having to negotiate their survival and way of life within the bosom of a new 
empire.241 From 1766 to 1780, the French inhabitants of Upper Louisiana successfully 
negotiated their place under the Spanish regime. By integrating into the Spanish colonial 
governing structure of the region, they insured that their customs and institutions would 
continue to influence the colonial policies of Upper Louisiana. 
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